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Abstract 
 Market-based instruments, particularly cap-and-trade programs, have been the 
focus of attention in environmental policy in recent years. The success of the US Acid 
Rain Program, dubbed the “grand policy experiment,” has inspired governments across 
the globe to turn to the market for the purpose of controlling pollution. This paper 
attempts to formulate a policy recommendation for a future domestic cap-and-trade 
program for climate change policy in the United States. The paper describes and 
evaluates the US Acid Rain Program and the UK Emissions Trading Scheme in detail in 
order to gain insight into two relatively successful experiences with cap-and-trade. The 
paper then examines lessons that can be drawn from both programs in conjunction with 
existing economic research on greenhouse gas trading in order to determine the precise 
design of a successful future climate change trading scheme for the US. The study 
concludes that a multiphase, upstream hybrid cap-and-trade program with a revenue-
raising auction will produce least-cost reductions in carbon dioxide emissions and 
contribute to the mitigation of global climate change. 
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“If it is feasible to establish a market to implement a policy, no policy-maker can afford 
to do without one. Unless I am very much mistaken, markets can be used to implement 
any anti-pollution policy that you or I can dream up.” J.H. Dales, 1968 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, policymakers have been focusing on the creation of markets and 
the trading of pollution rights for the purpose of controlling environmental problems. The 
flexibility and cost savings associated with market-based environmental policy 
instruments have allowed policymakers to control pollution in an efficient manner. As a 
result of the success of the US Acid Rain Program, increased attention has been given to 
cap-and-trade schemes, defined as market-based instruments that allow firms to trade or 
bank emission discharge permits in order to achieve a specific environmental objective. 
The implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme requires the pollution control agency to 
determine a desired target reduction level as well as the associated level of allowable 
emissions. The agency then establishes an allocation process for permits, distributing just 
enough permits to meet the emissions target. Economists note the advantages of 
emissions trading in theory as being cost-effectiveness, flexibility for polluters, and static 
and dynamic efficiency, to name a few.  
 Some emissions trading began to take form in the 1970s in the US with four 
distinct policies that fell under a credit system: the offset policy, the bubble policy, 
banking, and netting—all of which will be discussed later in the paper. Still, these 
policies were subject to substantial regulation by the government. It was not until 1990 
that significant flexibility in policy was introduced in the US with the first wide-scale 
cap-and-trade program. 
 Title IV of the US Clean Air Act of 1990, also known as the US Acid Rain 
Program, has an overall purpose to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from coal- and oil-
fired electricity generation plants across the country, in order to prevent the adverse 
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effects caused by acid deposition. Acid precipitation forms when SO2 and NOx react in 
the atmosphere, primarily with water vapor, to form acidic compounds that are then 
deposited on to the ground in wet or dry form. SO2 is the primary precursor for acid rain, 
and the one that this paper will focus on. It is emitted into the atmosphere primarily from 
burning sulfurous fuels, especially coal, from power stations and other combustion 
plants; in the US, approximately 70% of annual SO2 emissions come from the electric 
power industry.1 Acid rain has a number of negative impacts, including the acidification 
of lakes and streams, impaired visibility in national parks, the creation of respiratory 
problems in people, weakened forests, and the degradation of monuments and buildings.2 
The domestic issues caused by acid deposition are, however, only part of the problem. 
 Acid deposition is a known transboundary pollutant problem as a result of 
windfall patterns; sulfuric acid is deposited not only in the US, but is also carried across 
the Canadian border. The issue was first brought up in 1977, when the Canadian 
government called for immediate negotiations between the two countries concerning 
environmental policy. A scientific fact-finding committee concluded in 1980 that the US 
produced 70-80% of the pollutants that moved across the border to Canada, whereas 
Canada’s production of pollutants that were deposited in the US was fairly small in 
comparison. Unfortunately, cooperation between the two countries did not make much 
progress in the 1980’s, as the Canadian government made demands for rather large 
reductions of SO2 emissions (usually around 50%) and President Reagan subsequently 
rejected every demand. It was not until 1990 that talks between the two countries picked 
up again, and the US Acid Rain Program was signed into law. 
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 Title IV of the 1990 US Clean Air Act called for a cap-and-trade system 
consisting of a 10 million ton reduction in SO2 emissions from 1980 levels by the year 
2000. The program is composed of two phases, with reductions enforced through the 
annual issuance of tradable emissions permits, or “allowances.”  Each allowance permits 
a holder to emit one ton of SO2 in a particular year or any subsequent year; in other 
words, allowances may be “banked” for future use, although they may not be borrowed 
from the future. The last main feature of the program includes the requirement for 
polluters to install continuous emissions monitoring equipment in order to ensure 
compliance with the program. 
 Overall, the US Acid Rain Program has been hailed as being extremely successful 
and economically efficient in its emission reductions.3 As of 2006, SO2 emissions have 
been reduced by more than 6.3 million tons from 1990 levels.4 The market for allowances 
has proven to be efficient and competitive, and developed rather quickly, establishing 
itself by 1994.5 Allowance prices were also lower than anticipated and transmitted the 
reduced value of marginal abatement quickly and efficiently to firms contemplating more 
costly abatement measures, thus minimizing the amount of unnecessary costly 
abatement.6 In addition, ex post studies have found that the program has achieved results 
at a significantly lower cost than expected.7 The success of the program lead to much 
more interest in cap-and-trade, including in the United Kingdom, where the government 
implemented a national cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions in 2002 as 
part of their Climate Change Programme.  
 The UK’s Climate Change Programme has three parts to it, with one of those 
parts being a cap-and-trade scheme for a basket of greenhouse gas emissions, measured 
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in terms of CO2 equivalent. CO2 emissions have increased roughly 30% since the year 
17508, and to understand the problem with this increase, one must be familiar with the 
general climate change problem. The climate system is driven by energy from the sun, 
which enters the atmosphere in the form of radiation. The greenhouse gases (which 
include CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur 
hexafluoride) absorb this radiation and thus retain heat. The problem is that emissions 
have increased dramatically over time, as previously stated, making it difficult for energy 
to be released back into space and thus creating a build-up of greenhouse gases. In order 
to make up for the added energy in the atmosphere, the earth’s climate adjusts itself—this 
is known as the “enhanced greenhouse gas effect.” In order to adjust itself, the earth 
experiences an increase in the global mean temperature, increases or decreases in 
precipitation, and an increase in extreme weather events. CO2 is arguably the most 
important greenhouse gas as it accounts for 60% of the enhanced greenhouse gas effect 
and has a lifetime of approximately 100 years.  
 The UK’s Emissions Trading Scheme was the first large-scale greenhouse gas 
trading program. As part of the Kyoto Protocol, the UK agreed to reduce its emissions by 
12.5% below 1990 levels by 2012; however, internally, they decided on a target of 20% 
below 1990 levels by 2010. The UK’s Emissions Trading Scheme was launched in April 
2002 as part of their Climate Change Programme, with the objectives of achieving a 
significant amount of emission reductions in an economically efficient manner, and also 
of enabling businesses to gain experience in the practice of emissions trading in order to 
prepare them for the upcoming EU trading program. The UK’s program was voluntary, 
freely allocated allowances that they allowed to be banked, and ran from January 2002 to 
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December 2006. As of 2008, the government projects that the nation will meet its Kyoto 
target of a 12.5% reduction by 2012. Direct participants have reduced their greenhouse 
gas emissions by over 7.2 million tonnes against their baselines at the start of the scheme 
in 2002.9 The market has also proven to be quite liquid with broad participation—on 
average over 176,000 allowances were traded per month in the first three years of the 
scheme.10 Lastly, there is also evidence of static efficiency and the attempt to satisfy the 
equimarginal principle in the program given by the fact that firms with low marginal 
abatement costs tended to sell allowances to firms with high marginal abatement costs.11 
While evaluations of the US and UK programs have provided positive results, what does 
this mean for the future of cap-and-trade? 
This study on cap-and-trade schemes will have two main areas of concentration: 
evaluations of the successes and failures of two wide-scale trading programs—the US 
and the UK programs, and lessons that can be drawn from those evaluations for a future 
national US greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program. When I compose possible lessons for 
a future program, I will ask the following: What can be learned from the already 
established US and UK programs to help form a national US greenhouse gas cap-and-
trade program? In addition, what does economic theory imply for an efficient greenhouse 
gas trading program? In particular, what design options should be considered, in terms of 
voluntary or compulsory participation, distribution of permits, the extent of monitoring, 
the sectors covered by the scheme, and more. 
The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows: In Chapter One, I will 
describe the US Acid Rain Program in detail, followed by an evaluation of the program 
structured around economic efficiency. Chapter Two will examine the UK Emissions 
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Trading Scheme, describing the program in detail and evaluating it. In Chapter Three, I 
will analyze several design aspects of emissions trading programs in general, while also 
discussing lessons learned from the designs of the US and UK programs. I will conclude 
this chapter with my presentation of a possible greenhouse gas cap-and-trade scheme for 
the US, followed by a conclusion. 
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Chapter One: The US Acid Rain Program 
 
Chapter One will focus on the US Acid Rain Program, with the purpose of 
investigating the effectiveness of a domestic cap-and-trade scheme in the US, and, in 
particular, which elements of the program’s design made it successful. The chapter is 
structured as follows: Part I will discuss the history of acid rain legislation in the US, Part 
II will describe the Acid Rain Program in detail, and Part III will discuss evaluations of 
the program based on economic studies.  
 
Part I: The History 
In order to understand the context in which Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments was passed, it is necessary to review the history of acid rain legislation in 
the US. During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority of SO2 emissions was generated from 
thermal power plants, particularly those located in the Midwestern part of the US that 
were also quite old and large, and burning medium- or high-sulfur coal.12 Scientists 
working for the Ontario government brought attention to the problem in the 1970s by 
showing that lakes were being acidified in a county north of Toronto. Environment 
Canada scientists conducted further meteorological research that indicated that the acid 
rain falling in Eastern Canada was not all from domestic sources, but rather it was due to 
the long-range transport of pollutants from the US. 
The 1970 Clean Air Act was the first major piece of environmental legislation put 
into place by the US, and it provided the government with increased regulation over 
emissions. It established four major systems: NAAQS, SIPS, NSPS, and NESHAPS. 
NAAQS set up a system of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for “criteria” 
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pollutants, including SO2, which set limits in order to protect public health and welfare. 
SIPs, or State Implementation Plans, were also set up in order to provide a description of 
how individual states intended to comply with the Clean Air Act requirements and 
maintain the NAAQSs, as well as to provide a means of regulating existing stationary 
sources’ air emissions. NSPS, or New Source Performance Standards, placed regulations 
on new units, and NESHAPS, or National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants, were set up to ensure protection of public health and to prevent adverse 
environmental effects of select air pollutants.  
Analysis done by Portney (2007) concerning the 1970 program indicates that it 
was not particularly successful, mostly because it provided no incentive for technological 
innovation.13 To obtain local ambient standards, plants would simply build taller 
emissions stacks; unfortunately, these actions merely passed the pollution problem on to 
geographically distant areas. Other problems with this initial act included little flexibility 
for polluters to modify their production processes in order to achieve reductions in 
emissions, and the overly expensive nature of the scheme, due partly to the specified 
pollution-control equipment required for new plants. Further analysis also shows that the 
Clean Air Act created a gap between the old and new plants, since new plants had 
different performance standards.14 While the goal of these different performance 
standards was to encourage old power plants to retire their operations, they instead 
created an incentive for old plants to stick around longer, since replacing an old plant 
with a new plant was a relatively expensive process.15  
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments were introduced apparently in response to 
new concerns raised by environmental groups, as well as because of the inability of many 
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states to reach their emission reduction targets.16 The Amendments extended the deadline 
for meeting emission reduction targets to 1982, and they also set new requirements for 
new coal-fired plants. The new requirements included some flexibility by stating that new 
plants had to have an emissions rate less than or equal to 1.2lb of SO2 per million Btu of 
fuel burned, and either a) remove 90% of potential SO2 emissions, or b) remove 70% of 
SO2 emissions and operate with an emissions rate of less than 0.6lb of SO2 per million 
Btu of fuel burned. The Amendments still included heavy regulation, however, including 
certain technology requirements. The 1977 Amendments included a new system, dubbed 
“PSD” or Prevention of Services Deterioration, which applied to new major sources or 
major modifications at existing sources, for pollutants whose sources were located in 
attainment or were considered unclassifiable within NAAQS. Part of the PSD required 
the installment of BACT—the Best Available Control Technology. Technology 
requirements also existed for new sources in nonattainment areas—these sources were 
required to utilize LAER, the Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate. These requirements 
gave plants little flexibility and also put huge expenses at their doorsteps. 
During the latter part of the 1970s, the government recognized the need for more 
flexibility within their strongly regulated framework in order to achieve their clean air 
objective.17 Flexibility began with the Offset Policy in 1976 that allowed new emissions 
sources to establish themselves in nonattainment areas, as long as the sources agreed to 
pay for offsetting emission reductions at other places in the region by purchasing 
Emission Reduction Credits (or ERCs). The goal of the Offset Policy was to deal with the 
problem involving the establishment of new or expanding sources while still meeting 
current ambient standards as quickly as possible. The advantage of the Offset Policy was 
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that regional air quality would be improved since emissions would decrease even when 
new sources began operations after their purchasing of ERCs. New flexibility was 
developed further with the “Bubble Policy” in 1979, which allowed utilities with multiple 
emission points to be regulated as a group, rather than requiring individual reductions for 
each source. The Bubble Policy was extended with the first emergence of an emissions 
trading idea, allowing for the purchase of ERCs from other plants as an alternative means 
to directly regulating pollution. The policy also attempted to satisfy the equimarginal 
principle—polluters were allowed to allocate abatement in the most efficient way among 
units. 
By 1986, a credit-based trading scheme was put into place for seven pollutants 
affecting local air quality. The system set up 247 control regions across the US coexisting 
with a command-and-control regulation of technology-based standards administered at 
the federal and state levels. An Emission Reduction Credit linked the Offset and Bubble 
policies with two new policies of Netting and Banking within the program. Netting 
allowed currently expanding, new plants to escape the new source review requirements, 
provided that the plant offset any increase in emissions with the appropriate amount of 
credits, and that the increase was negligible. Banking allowed plants to store permits for 
future use, although borrowing permits from the future was not allowed.  
The 1986 program had notable successes and failures, all of which influenced the 
design of later schemes. Analysis showed that the program achieved cost savings of $10 
billion, with thousands of cost saving trades being completed.18 In addition, netting 
proved to be a popular option among polluters19, achieving between $525 million and $12 
billion in cost savings.20 Despite the improvements in cost savings, however, the program 
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ended up having quite a few problems. Notably, the market was not really efficient—
most trades were completed internally because of the lower transactions costs, and 
polluters found it difficult to locate buyers and sellers.21 In addition, the use of the Offset, 
Bubble, and Banking opportunities was limited, even though sufficient cost savings could 
have been achieved through the use of these programs.22 Most likely, the inefficient 
market resulted from the lengthy, complex, and expensive procedures required in order to 
gain approval for a trade. In the end, more work needed to be done to create an efficient 
and successful emissions trading scheme. 
During his election campaign of 1988, George H.W. Bush advertised himself as 
the “Environmental President”, and he made it known that he was interested in 
marketplace innovations to solve environmental problems. Once he was elected, the 
Project 88 Report, sponsored by Senators Timothy Wirth and John Heinz, was conducted 
at Harvard University’s Kennedy School and discussed a variety of market-based 
approaches to the problem of acid rain. By June 12, 1989, the Bush Administration’s 
Clean Air Proposal was announced in general terms, and the draft legislation was 
released on July 21st. After approvals by the Senate and the House, President Bush signed 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments into law on November 15, 1990.  
 
Part II: The Program 
The legislation of Title IV of the 1990 US Clean Air Act Amendments stated its 
purpose as to “reduce the adverse effects of acid deposition through reductions in annual 
emissions of sulfur dioxide of 10 million tons from 1980 emission levels.”23 Affected 
sources would be required to reduce emissions by specific deadlines, and they could do 
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so with some flexibility. As stated in the legislation, compliance with emission 
limitations could be achieved “through alternative methods…provided by an emission 
allocation and transfer system.”24 In other words, the Acid Rain Program is an emissions 
trading scheme. 
As previously stated, the type of emissions trading scheme employed under Title 
IV is known as a cap-and-trade system. There is an aggregate cap placed on SO2 
emissions from electric generating plants of around 9 million tons per year from the year 
2000 onwards, with the final cap of 8.95 million tons being imposed in 2010. The idea of 
having an aggregate cap was a fundamental difference from earlier acid rain programs—
different polluters can abate in varying amounts, depending on their costs of abatement, 
as long as total emissions are less than or equal to the aggregate cap. An aggregate cap 
with a trading system gives polluters much more flexibility as to how and where they 
decide to reduce their emissions, rather than having regulators determine a specific 
reduction for each individual source. The aggregate cap results in the annual reduction of 
10 million tons of SO2 emissions from 1980 levels, and this goal is being met by many 
plants through the use of the allowance system. 
The initial allocation of allowances is done on a grandfathered basis, which means 
that past emissions in a given baseline year determine the amount of allowances each unit 
should be allocated. For the Acid Rain Program, allowances are allocated based on the 
average fossil fuel consumption between 1985-1987 at an emission rate of 2.5lb of SO2 
per million Btu of fuel input for Phase I, and an average of 1.2lb SO2 per million Btu of 
fuel input for Phase II. At the end of each year, each source needs to hold a number of 
allowances equal to its annual emissions, and it is never allowed to have its emissions 
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exceed ambient air quality standards for public health, no matter how many allowances it 
currently holds. Flexibility comes from permit trading, where allowances can be bought 
or sold by sources and even by corporations, brokers, municipalities, or environmental 
groups. Besides buying and selling allowances, banking is also an option so that utilities 
can store allowances for future use if necessary. 
In addition to obtaining allowances via initial allocations and trading, the EPA 
also holds an annual allowance auction in late March. As discussed earlier, the EPA 
creates an allowance reserve by buying 2.8% of the allocated allowances from utilities, 
and utilities are paid the price that the allowances pick up at the auction (thus, the 
auctions are zero-revenue for the EPA). The auctions also allow for private holders to sell 
their allowances if they so desire. The way that a typical auction works is bidders submit 
sealed offers for both the amount and type of allowances they want. Bidders can submit 
offers for allowances in the spot market, which can be used in the same year or banked 
for the future. In contrast, they can submit offers for allowances in the forward market, 
which can only be used after 7 years in the future. In addition to designating the amount 
and type of allowances they need, bidders must also write down the maximum price they 
are willing to pay for the allowances, or the demand price. The supply price of 
allowances from the EPA reserves is always zero, while private suppliers determine the 
minimum prices that they would like to offer their allowances for. The supply and 
demand prices are then ranked in ascending order, with the starting points being the 
lowest supply and demand prices.  In the end, the lowest supply prices are linked with the 
highest demand prices; so bidders pay the price they are willing to pay for the 
allowances. The process usually starts with the EPA allowances being sold first at the 
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lowest supply prices, and continues until one of the following occurs: all of the 
allowances are sold, the minimum supply price exceeds the maximum demand price, or 
all bids are used up. 
The purpose of the auctions is to obtain a price signal, as well as to create a way 
for utilities to purchase allowances in case they cannot obtain them by any other means.25 
The EPA also establishes direct sales, with the thought being that there is a possibility of 
existing utilities attempting to reduce competition by making it difficult for new 
independent power producers to enter the market.26 Thus, the EPA wants to ensure that 
new plants would be able to purchase allowances if they needed them.  
Apart from the basic form of the Acid Rain Program, there are a few distinct 
provisions that were added to the legislation that are worth mentioning, notably for Phase 
I or “Table A” units. “Table A” units, as they are commonly known, are the 263 dirtiest 
large generating units who were required to reduce emissions by roughly 3.5 million tons 
per year between the years 1995-1999. Phase II, which began in 2000, set limits for 
virtually all fossil-fueled electric generating plants above 25 MW capacities. Although 
there were over 30 different special provisions added to the legislation for Phase II units, 
it is the substitution and extensions provisions that are relevant to this study. The 
substitution provision states that sources “may include…a proposal to reassign, in whole 
or in part, the affected unit’s sulfur dioxide reduction requirements to any other unit(s) 
under the control of such owner or operator.”27 In other words, Table A units may instead 
choose to have their allowances allocated to other units, with the allowances based on the 
historic emissions of the new unit. The extensions provision allows units to “petition the 
Administrator…for an extension of two years of the deadline…to qualify for such an 
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extension, the affected unit must either employ a qualifying Phase I technology, or 
transfer its Phase I emissions reduction obligation to a unit employing a qualifying Phase 
I technology.”28 The point of this provision clearly is to provide an incentive for units to 
install flue-gas desulfurization facilities, otherwise known as “scrubbers.” This facility 
essentially removes the sulfur from the flue-gas, and it is an alternative to switching to 
low-sulfur coal. If units agree to install the relatively expensive facility, they are 
essentially granted bonus allowances.  
In order for Title IV to have had the potential of being successful, significant 
monitoring and enforcement policies needed to be enacted. The EPA records all transfers 
of allowances through an allowance tracking system. The system is built on the transfer 
forms that are required from both parties involved in the trade. In addition, the EPA also 
keeps track of units that emit more than the number of allowances they hold through 
continuous monitoring equipment that most plants are required to install. Compliance 
with the program is determined at the end of each year, with a 30-day grace period at the 
beginning of the next calendar year for plants to cover any other emissions. If a plant is 
found to have not complied with emissions standards, they are fined $2,000 (in 1990 $)1 
per excess ton of emissions, and it is required that the excess be offset in the following 
year. Thus, polluters have significant incentive to comply with the program. 
 
Part III: Evaluation 
Perhaps one of the more obvious questions to ask regarding the US Acid Rain 
Program is whether or not it has actually succeeded in reducing SO2 emissions. As of 
                                                 
1
 This number has been adjusted for inflation over time. The fine was $3,273 in 2007. 
 16 
2007, annual SO2 emissions had fallen below the long-term emissions cap of 8.95 million 
tons (to be met by 2010) for the first time—total SO2 emissions from 3,536 affected 
electric generating units stood at 8.9 million tons in that year.29  It is estimated that, by 
2005, reductions from Phase I units accounted for roughly 57% of total SO2 emission 
reductions, while reductions from Phase II units accounted for roughly 14% of total SO2 
emission reductions.30 Ellerman (2005) estimates a reduction of approximately 4 million 
tons in the first year of the program alone, and he put together a figure (shown as Figure 
1.1 in this paper) to illustrate the difference between SO2 emissions during the trading 
program and what emissions would have been in absence of a program (the 
counterfactual).31 One can see how actual emissions declined sharply with the start of the 
program in 1995 and how much lower these emissions are from the counterfactual 
emissions. It is clear that the actual emissions line is tending toward the cap, as it indeed 
has done as of 2007. 
  
Figure 1.132  
In addition, while SO2 emissions have decreased by roughly 43% since 1990, heat 
input for electricity generation has increased significantly, meaning that reductions in 
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SO2 emissions took place despite a growing demand for electricity. Figure 1.2 illustrates 
SO2 emission reductions alongside the rise in heat input and electricity generation.  
 
Figure 1.233 
These successful changes are certainly notable in terms of numbers, but scientists have 
also concluded that the reductions have led to improvements in the health of the 
environment. Over the course of the program, scientists have made use of long-term 
monitoring equipment, such as CASTNET, or Clean Air Status and Trends Network, and 
NADP/NTN, or National Atmospheric Deposition Program/National Trends Network. 
These two pieces of equipment are used to monitor temporal and spatial trends in 
regional air quality and acid deposition. As of 2007, the data collected by the monitoring 
equipment has shown that the reduction in SO2 emissions from the power industry has 
indeed improved air quality. In addition, wet sulfate deposition has also declined 
significantly since the adoption of the Acid Rain Program in the Ohio River Valley and 
northeastern United States. It is estimated that public health benefits from emission 
reductions have exceeded program costs by a margin of more than 40:1.34 Lastly, sulfate 
concentrations in lakes and streams across the major regions of the US have decreased 
substantially between 1990 and 2005. 
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One of the main concerns regarding the implementation of an emissions trading 
scheme to combat SO2 emissions was the environmental effect on certain “hot spots”—
mainly the northeastern part of the United States. SO2 is not a uniformly mixed pollutant, 
meaning that the damage of where pollution occurs depends upon where the emissions 
occur. Because of wind patterns, emissions by sources in the Midwest cause large 
amounts of acid deposition in the Northeast. The fear with the Acid Rain Program was 
that emissions would increase in the Ohio River Valley as a result of trading and this 
would cause negative health effects for the New England area. Fortunately, as Burtraw & 
Mansur (1999) have found, increases in the Ohio River Valley imply decreases in other 
states which also have an impact on the Northeast, thus trading actually led to 
improvements in air quality in the Northeast.35 It is important to note that these initial 
concerns will not be relevant for any future trading programs regarding climate policy, 
which will be discussed later in the paper. Since greenhouse gases are considered to be 
uniformly mixed pollutants, the locations of damage do not depend upon the locations of 
emission sources. 
While the amount of emission reductions taking place has been impressive, and 
the environment is certainly benefiting from the program, it is difficult to tell the true 
effectiveness of the emissions trading scheme without comparing actual emissions with a 
hypothetical emissions rate under a Command-and-Control scheme. A counterfactual 
comparison is necessary since it is impossible to tell whether reductions in emissions 
occurred because of the Acid Rain Program, or because of other outside factors (such as 
some units switching to low-sulfur coal). In their analysis of the success of the Acid Rain 
Program, Ellerman et al. (2000) make use of both a simple and an econometrically 
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estimated counterfactual in order to make a plausible comparison between emission 
reductions with and without the emissions trading scheme.36 The authors make the 
argument that the econometrically estimated counterfactual is a more accurate measure, 
and so they subsequently run a “fixed effects” linear regression in order to estimate the 
reduction in SO2 emissions attributable to Title IV. They accomplished this by 
calculating the difference between aggregate estimated counterfactual emissions and 
actual emissions. The results from the regression analysis indicate that the aggregate 
reduction attributable to Title IV was about 4 million tons in each of the first three years 
of Phase I.37 Based on the EPA’s measurement of emission reductions over the years and 
the econometric analysis done by Ellerman et al. (2000), it can be concluded that the US 
Acid Rain Program has succeeded in its goal of achieving a significant amount of 
reductions in emissions. 
At this point, it has been determined that using a market-based instrument as 
opposed to a Command-and-Control instrument for the control of SO2 emissions in the 
US has worked out well. My main concern, however, has to do with the components of 
the cap-and-trade scheme that made the Acid Rain Program successful, or, if any, what 
components failed. A main point of focus is the allowance system—in particular, the 
efficiency of the allowance market and the determination of an allowance price. 
Ellerman et al. (2000) present an excellent set of criteria for determining the 
efficiency of the allowance market, including the transparency of prices to buyers and 
sellers, low transactions costs, quick exploitation of arbitrage opportunities, and the 
engagement in emissions trading by buyers and sellers in order to lower compliance 
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costs.38 Overall, analysts have determined that, particularly since the middle of 1994, the 
allowance system has had a robust market with clear prices and low transactions costs.39  
 
 Figure 1.340 
Figure 1.3 shows the amount of allowances being traded each year. 1994 shows a 
substantial increase in trades in the private market (that is, the market outside of EPA 
auctions). It is probable that buyers and sellers were lacking information about a market-
clearing price in the beginning of the program, which explains the low trading volume 
until 1994.41 Burtraw & Bohi (1997) suggest that the promised benefits of allowance 
trading were not yet realized in the beginning of the program by utilities.42 Statistics also 
show, however, that approximately 45% of the 1995 allowance issuance was used in 
order to pursue cost savings through the trading43, and by March 1998, 20.3 million 
allowances were being traded privately, as compared to the 1.3 million being traded 
through the EPA auctions. Figure 1.3 clearly illustrates the increase in trading volume 
from the start of the program up until 2007. Recent data also shows that in 2007, there 
were 15.8 million allowances available for use from a combination of allocated 
allowances and banked allowances allocated in previous years. In that year, sources 
emitted approximately 8.9 million tons of SO2, which was much less than the amount of 
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allowances available.44 It is possible that the large number of unused allowances could 
have resulted from technological innovation on the part of sources; if sources have 
invested in scrubbers or low-sulfur coal, SO2 emissions would be less anyway, so the 
need for allowances would be smaller. In fact, the 2007 Acid Rain Progress Report does 
list scrubbers as a major factor in SO2 emission reductions in that year. The Progress 
Report also states that future emission reduction requirements under CAIR (Clean Air 
Interstate Rule)2 contributed to growing reductions in emissions, as well as the growing 
number of banked allowances in 2007.45 Sources may have engaged in early compliance 
planning for CAIR, with an incentive to bank pre-CAIR vintage SO2 allowances. 
 
 
Figure 1.446 
In addition to an appropriate trading volume, analysis has shown that prices have 
converged so that the spread between the average bid price and the lowest winning bid in 
the annual auction has narrowed. This indicates a market that is closer to a market with 
one price, such as a perfectly competitive market, since a perfectly competitive market 
would have one universally known market price and no spread between bid and offer 
                                                 
2
 CAIR refers to a new rule issued by the EPA in 2005 that places a further cap on SO2 and NOx emissions 
in the eastern U.S. to be achieved by 2015. 
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prices at the auction. Figure 1.4 shows two examples of the buyers’ offer curve and the 
sellers’ offer curve from the 1993 and 1998 spot auctions, with the point of intersection 
indicating a market-clearing price. It is clear from the graphs that the buyers’ offer curve 
has flattened over time, which is consistent with the development of an efficient market 
of allowances.47 Further evidence of an efficient allowance market comes from the fact 
that a futures market developed with a relatively low “convenience yield”—a 
“convenience yield” describes the benefit that results from holding a stock of allowances 
on hand.48 A low “convenience yield” suggests that there was not much worry about 
being short on allowances in order to meet regulatory requirements.  
 
Figure 1.549 
One of the main causes for concern regarding the allowance market in the early 
stages of the program was the low price of allowances. Several estimates were put forth 
before the program was enacted which priced allowances between $250 and $300, on 
average, for Phase I.50 In fact, allowances cleared a price of $131 at the first EPA auction, 
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and prices declined steadily throughout the year, reaching a low of $70 in March 1996. 
Figure 1.5 illustrates the allowance prices from 1994 to 2008; from these statistics, it can 
be seen that allowance prices only reached the lower bounds of the EPRI estimate for 
Phase I (between $205 and $350) in 1998. The majority of analysts have attributed the 
low prices to an over-commitment in compliance in Phase I. Burtraw (1996) claims that 
the most important explanation for the low prices comes from changing market 
fundamentals in coal markets, rail transportation of coal, and equipment suppliers. In 
particular, prices in the coal and scrubber markets decreased during this time period, 
leading many utilities to invest in low-sulfur coal and the installation of scrubbers as a 
means of reducing emissions, as opposed to buying allowances to cover excess 
emissions.51 It should be noted, however, that the low price of allowances in Phase I 
should not necessarily be considered a problem. Burtraw (1996) states that the program 
still generated tremendous cost savings despite the low prices and few amount of trades 
taking place.52 Figure 1.5 also shows that prices rose dramatically beginning in March 
2004, reaching a peak between March 2005 and March 2006, and declined again through 
March 2008. The most likely explanation for these price movements is uncertainty 
regarding the introduction of the CAIR legislation, which was issued on March 10, 2005.  
On the other hand, there are several studies on the efficiency of the allowance 
market that have found that firms were not always meeting their reduction targets in a 
least-cost manner, as opportunities for cost savings were not necessarily realized. In 
particular, Carlson et al. (2000) finds that, during the first two years of Phase I, actual 
compliance costs exceeded the least-cost solution by $280 million in 1995 (in 1995 $) 
and $339 million in 1996 (in 1995 $).53 It is possible that, in the beginning of the 
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program, state public utility regulations deterred units from engaging in allowance 
transactions, due to the fact that firms were uncertain about how regulators would treat 
allowance transactions when setting regulated rates.54 Certain studies, such as Rose 
(1997), suggest that public utility commission activities discouraged units from using the 
market in favor of investing in low-sulfur coal and the installation of scrubbers.55 In 
general, econometric studies that have tried to show this discouragement have been 
conflicting. Arimura (2002) finds that generating units facing PUC regulations were more 
likely to rely on fuel switching for compliance as opposed to using the allowance 
market.56 On the other hand, Bailey (1998) finds the opposite case—that PUC regulations 
had little to nothing to do with the decision of units to use the allowance market.57 While 
outside influences on the efficiency of the allowance market in the first few years of the 
program are somewhat ambiguous, it is clear from earlier analysis that the market still 
became robust and efficient over time.  
Perhaps one of the biggest surprises that came about during Phase I of the Acid 
Rain Program was the over-compliance on the part of polluters. There are two main 
reasons that have been given as to why over-compliance occurred: an over-investment in 
scrubbers prior to the program, and commitments to long-term low-sulfur coal 
contracts.58 Apparently, many units made the decision to invest in flue gas desulfurization 
facilities in 1992 and 1993, mainly because they did not realize that allowance prices 
would end up being lower than the estimates. Even still, variable costs of scrubbing were 
approximately $65 per ton, which was lower than even the lowest price that allowances 
reached, making the scrubber a worthwhile investment. In addition, the expectation of 
higher allowance prices also induced units to enter into long-term low-sulfur coal 
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contracts. In order to avoid the run-up of low-sulfur coal prices that might occur once 
Title IV took effect in 1995, polluters would agree to a contract that would lock in the 
price of coal. Some analysts found the over-compliance during Phase I to be a negative 
aspect of the program, stating that it caused the removal of potential bidders from the 
markets, which would further affect the market prices for allowances59, and this is why 
many people state over-compliance (or, the excessive banking of allowances) as being 
the cause for lower than expected allowance prices. Ellerman & Montero (2002), 
however, examine the over-compliance later in the program and determine that more 
compliance is often required in the first stage of programs in order for marginal costs to 
be equalized over the two stages.60 
The main goal of the Acid Rain Program was to lower the cost of compliance by 
providing polluters with the flexibility and incentive to abate in the least-cost way. 
Ellerman et al. (2000) discuss several pieces of evidence that suggest that participants 
have taken advantage of the cost saving opportunities provided during Phase I of the Acid 
Rain Program. First of all, as already discussed, there has been the emergence of an 
external allowance market. For those units who expect to face high marginal costs of 
abatement, the allowances provide a relatively cheap method of compliance. In addition, 
for many units—notably Phase II units who were not also Phase I units—the allowance 
market is the only way to take advantage of the lower abatement-cost opportunities 
provided in Phase I. As already noted earlier, there has been significant participation in 
the allowance market, which implies that polluters are taking advantage of the cost-
saving opportunities provided by the program. 
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Besides the efficiency of the allowance market, it is also important to examine the 
dynamic efficiency of the program; that is, was there an appropriate amount of innovation 
that emerged as a result of the flexibility the program allows? The evidence suggests an 
answer of yes. Several utilities ended up switching from high-sulfur coal to the cleaner 
low-sulfur coal, and others chose to blend coals of varying sulfur content as a means of 
reducing average SO2 emissions. Utilities have also been successfully encouraged to 
invest in scrubbers, mainly due to the subsidy available for those who decide to make 
such an investment. The rise in the use of scrubbers may also help explain the low prices 
of allowances in the market due to an increase in the supply of allowances. 
There has also been a divergence between the control levels adopted by Phase I 
units and the control levels that would have been undertaken if there were no emissions 
trading scheme.61 Many units used allowances in addition to those that were allocated to 
them, indicating an avoidance of higher abatement costs than those found elsewhere. 
Lastly, there has been a convergence of the premium paid for low-sulfur coal with 
allowance prices, combined with related changes in abatement at Phase I units. In order 
to determine the least-cost method of abatement, polluters will calculate the equivalent 
allowance value, or EAV. If the EAV premium for low-sulfur coal were less than the 
price of an allowance, then polluters would purchase low-sulfur coal. On the other side, if 
the EAV premium for low-sulfur coal were more than the price of an allowance, then 
polluters would stick with high-sulfur coal and buy allowances to cover its emissions. 
Analysts have observed that allowance prices and the EAV of coal-sulfur premiums 
tended to converge, and when allowance prices fell, the emissions rate at Phase I units 
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increased.62 Both of these observations point to the conclusion that electric utilities have 
taken advantage of the opportunity to abate in a least-cost way. 
Perhaps one of the most important questions to be asked about the Acid Rain 
Program is whether or not it has contributed to least-cost reductions; in other words, have 
there been more cost savings than there would have been under a different pollution 
control program? Burtraw et al. (2005) examine the existence of cost savings by citing 
that allowance prices have been substantially lower than what was originally predicted 
before the program was implemented. Certain factors, such as the decline in the cost of 
low-sulfur coal in the 1990s, contributed to the marginal cost of emission reductions 
(which, in turn, determines the price of an allowance) but were not included in initial 
price estimates because they were independent of the program. Thus, it is possible that 
the difference between actual allowance prices and the original estimates has been 
exaggerated, and the existence of cost savings must be examined in another way. 
The best way to evaluate the cost savings attributable to the Acid Rain Program is 
to compare total costs under trading with a counterfactual baseline’s costs, or a program 
that did not employ emissions trading. Several analysts have made use of the 
counterfactual to estimate cost savings, including Carlson et al. (2000) and Ellerman et al. 
(2000). Carlson et al (2000) uses an econometric simulation model based on marginal 
abatement cost functions derived from an econometrically estimated long-run total cost 
function for electricity generation for a sample of 800 plus units operating between the 
years 1985-1994.63 Compared to the counterfactual (in this case, a uniform emissions rate 
standard), estimated potential cost savings attributable to the emissions trading program 
was $250 million (in 1995 $) during Phase I and $784 million per year in Phase II. 
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Outside of the program, Carlson et al. (2000) recognize the part fuel prices and technical 
change played in lowering costs over the time period of the program. They estimate that 
declining fuel prices lowered marginal control costs by $200 per ton (in 1995 $) over the 
1980s. In addition, it is estimated that technical change over time lowered marginal 
abatement cost functions by approximately $50 per ton (in 1995 $) over the decade 
preceding 1995. Overall, however, Carlson et al. (2000) attribute the majority of cost 
savings to the program itself, stating that 80% of the decline in marginal abatement costs 
is a result of the flexibility available within the program, and 20% is a result of technical 
change.64 In the long run, Carlson et al. (2000) estimate a cost savings of $1.1 billion 
annually through 2010. Ellerman et al. (2000) provide an even larger estimate of $1.4 
billion annually through 2010, using a similar counterfactual analysis. No matter which 
estimate is more accurate, it is clear that cost savings have been achieved in substantial 
amounts from allowing sources to engage in emissions trading. 
After analyzing the program in detail, it seems fair to label the first large-scale use 
of emissions trading as a success. The cost-effectiveness and general overall efficiency of 
the scheme has prompted policymakers to pay more attention to market-based 
instruments, and cap-and-trade programs in particular. Other countries can learn from the 
US Acid Rain Program for implementing their own acid rain legislation as well as other 
environmental policies. Several countries and regions, such as the United Kingdom, have 
already used lessons learned from the US Acid Rain Program for implementing climate 
change policies. Hopefully, the US can also learn from their own experience with 
emissions trading when they move forward with climate change legislation in the future. 
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Chapter Two: The UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
Chapter Two will focus on the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Programme, in 
particular their emissions trading scheme for managing greenhouse gas emissions. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the effectiveness of a domestic cap-and-trade 
program for greenhouse gases, in order to determine how well such a program would 
work in the United States. Of course, it should be noted that the United Kingdom 
operates under a different system of government, which would have an impact on the 
design of the country’s trading scheme; nonetheless, it is advantageous to evaluate the 
successes and failures of the UK’s program when considering possible scheme designs 
for the US. 
There are several domestic cap-and-trade programs for greenhouse gases that exist 
today, or are in planning stages, besides the UK’s program, including programs in 
Australia, New Zealand, and Denmark. In addition, the European Union implemented the 
largest multi-national greenhouse gas cap-and-trade scheme in the world in 2005, of 
which the UK is now a participant. In fact, one of the main reasons for the 
implementation of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme in 2002 was to give firms 
experience with a tradable permits system before entering the EU scheme. Still, the UK 
program is important to study today because the country arguably has the most 
experience with large-scale national carbon trading than any other country in the world. 
While the nation was dubbed the “dirty man of Europe” because of their lack of response 
to the issue of acid rain, they have been heralded as one of the initial leaders of 
international response to climate change.65 In addition, the UK also has experience with 
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merging an existing domestic program with an international program (the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme), which is a possibility for the US in the future.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Part I will provide an overview of the history of 
climate change policy from the UK’s perspective, with particular emphasis on the Kyoto 
Protocol. Part II will describe the UK Emissions Trading Scheme in detail, and Part III 
will evaluate the UK program, based mainly on reports done by economic consulting 
firms for the UK government. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with a brief look at the 
European Union’s international emissions trading program for CO2 emissions and issues 
with UK integration into the EU program. 
 
Part I: The History  
The recognition of climate change as a partly human-induced problem is actually a 
more recent development. Scientists proclaimed the need for a coordinated multilateral 
response in 1985 at the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) conference in 
Villach, Austria. In fact, many claim that this conference marked the transition of climate 
change as a scientific issue to also being an international political issue.66 The need to 
address the problems resulting from climate change was first recognized by the global 
political world with the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or 
IPCC, in 1988. The IPCC, which consists of a team of both scientists and economists, 
was set up with the intention of assessing climate change scientifically, and also of 
considering possible policy responses to the problem. The team concluded that a 
significant reduction in CO2 emissions was necessary in order to prevent future adverse 
climate impacts.  
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The next step in the control of CO2 emissions came with the negotiation of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC, which took place between 
1990 and 1992 and was initially promoted by the UK government. The goal of the 
Convention was to establish an objective, guiding principles, commitments, and 
institutional provisions in order to provide a basis for an international response. The 
Convention was eventually adopted on May 9, 1992 and was initially signed by 154 
states plus the European Commission in Rio de Janeiro in June of that year. Following 
the signing of the Convention, domestic debates ensued over the practicability of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, setting the stage for the commitments that would 
result later from the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Convention went into force on March 21, 1994, with the ultimate objective of 
stabilizing greenhouse gases “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”67 The timeframe provided for such stabilization is 
somewhat vague, being “sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate 
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”68 
Article 3 of the Convention runs through the basic principles that must be kept in 
mind when formulating a policy for climate change, especially when considering the 
establishment of an international program. In particular, “equity” and “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” are to be recognized, meaning that more developed 
countries are expected to take the lead in emission reductions, but that no country should 
be left out of at least the most basic requirements (such as reporting requirements). The 
Convention also clearly recognizes the special needs of developing countries in section 2 
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of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, all parties are to be guided in their actions 
by the needs and special circumstances of developing countries. The “Precautionary 
Principle” is another key principle held up by the Convention, stating that precautionary 
measures should be taken to “anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate 
change and mitigate its adverse effects.”69 Lastly, the Convention recognizes the right to 
sustainable development for each country based on national circumstances. 
 The Convention closes with an article concerning commitments, basically 
establishing the need for reporting on greenhouse gas inventories, domestic and regional 
climate change mitigation programs, and the promotion of other issues such as 
technology and sustainable development. 
Prior to the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol, many countries were working under 
their own domestic reduction targets that were determined in the early 1990s. The UK 
prepared an emission reduction plan after the 1995 Berlin Mandate that called for a 10 
million tonne reduction in CO2 emissions from 1990 levels by 2000. In the period prior to 
Kyoto, the UK and Germany were the only states that were expected to accomplish their 
stabilization goals by 2000, although the UK’s reductions were still thought to be limited, 
especially given the switch from coal to natural gas that occurred during this period. 
Much of the government’s climate change policy prior to Kyoto consisted of fuel taxes, 
renewable energy and voluntary accords with industry. 
The move toward Kyoto commenced with discussions in 1995 during the first 
Conference of Parties, more commonly referred to as COP-1. Unfortunately, COP-1 
resembled the UNFCCC negotiations in that not much progress was made toward a 
quantitative plan aside from the enforcement of the Berlin Mandate. COP-2 proved to be 
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slightly more successful, with the adoption of the Geneva Declaration that specifically 
called for a protocol that would include binding targets and timetables. The Kyoto 
Protocol was finally adopted after two-and-a-half years of intense negotiations on 
December 11, 1997 in Kyoto, Japan and was later entered into force in February 2005, 
after being ratified by the requisite number of countries. The Protocol essentially 
presented various policies and measures that countries were encouraged to consider, 
including energy efficiency policies, protections of sinks and reservoirs, sustainable 
forestry practices, and more. The main objectives and principles of the Protocol were 
essentially the same as those adopted under the Convention, but the Protocol established 
quantitative legally binding targets for countries categorized as Annex I Parties, which 
were considered to be the center piece of the Protocol. Countries included in the Annex I 
category include all members of the OECD, the European Union, and fourteen countries 
that were considered to have economies in transition. The expectation was that developed 
countries would take on relatively larger reductions as compared to the reductions taken 
on by developing countries. Reduction targets were specified for what were considered to 
be the six main greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. The target reductions for 
each party were quoted as combined targets for baskets of greenhouse gases, expressed in 
CO2 equivalence.  
Annex I Parties were required to reduce emissions by 5.2% collectively from 1990 
levels between the years 2008-2012. This time period was put into place with the 
intention of adding flexibility to the program in order to lessen the impact of any short 
run fluctuations in the program. The individual party commitments were established 
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through an assigned amount, calculated using the quantified emissions limitation and 
reduction commitments contained in Annex B of the protocol, along with estimates of 
emissions in the base year. The Protocol assigned a reduction target of 8% from 1990 
levels for most developed countries, including the UK, Germany, and the EU. The United 
States was assigned a slightly lower target reduction rate at 7%, although the government 
decided in 2001 not to ratify the Protocol. According to a further EU Burden-sharing 
Agreement, the UK agreed to reduce emissions even further by 12.5% from 1990 levels 
by 2012. The Protocol provided three “flexible mechanisms” to Annex B parties that may 
help them achieve their reduction targets at a lower cost. Joint Implementation allows 
Annex I parties to trade “credits” based on a project’s ability to reduce emissions, with 
the project being undertaken between Annex I countries with targets under Annex B of 
the Protocol. As of 2005, most projects took place in central and eastern European 
countries. The Clean Development Mechanism allows countries and companies from 
developed countries to invest in sustainable development projects in developing countries 
in return for Emission Reduction Credits. The final mechanism, and most significant 
mechanism for the purposes of this paper, is emissions trading, which the UK chose to 
employ as part of their Climate Change Programme.  
 
Part II: The Program 
In order for parties to achieve their assigned targets, they are required to implement 
their own domestic policy, which is what motivated the UK to implement its Climate 
Change Programme. The program was designed to meet the UK’s Kyoto agreement of a 
12.5% reduction by 2012, although the government went further with their own domestic 
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goal of a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by the year 2010. 
The Climate Change Programme consists of three main schemes: the Climate Change 
Levy, Climate Change Agreements, and the Emissions Trading Scheme. This paper is 
mainly concerned with the Emissions Trading Scheme as well as the involvement of 
Climate Change Agreement Participants in the trading program. It is beneficial, however, 
to have a brief overview of the entire Climate Change Programme for the sake of context, 
especially since all three programs connect with each other. The Climate Change Levy 
took effect in April 2001 as a single-stage tax on industrial energy use, with varying rates 
depending on the type of fuel being used. Electricity, for instance, is taxed at a rate of 
£.00456 per kilowatt hour, while any liquid gas (such as petroleum gas) is taxed at a rate 
of £.01018 per kilowatt hour.3 If utilities decide to join a Climate Change Agreement, the 
second program, then they qualify for an 80% discount on the levy. Thus, there is a 
financial incentive for a utility to join a Climate Change Agreement. Climate Change 
Agreements cover more than 40 energy-intensive sectors, and if a utility decides to join 
an Agreement, they are required to take on a quantitative energy efficient target. The 
“Agreement” part of the program consists of an agreement between the utility and the 
government, and takes several different forms depending on the type of reduction that the 
utility wants to achieve. The reduction can relate to energy use, greenhouse gas 
emissions, or both, and it can be specified in either absolute or relative terms. In other 
words, the reduction could be absolute in tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions, or it could 
be relative in CO2 equivalent emissions per unit of output. In practice, most organizations 
chose to think of their reductions in relative terms. Lastly, the Climate Change 
                                                 
3
 These figures are as of April 2008 – they have been adjusted for inflation over time. 
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Agreement has a two-tier structure that includes obligations for the sector as a whole as 
well as obligations for each individual firm. 
Climate Change Agreement Participants actually accounted for the majority of the 
organizations who were involved in the Emissions Trading Scheme, with 6000 firms 
choosing to participate. A total of 32 other firms, labeled as Direct Participants, 
accounted for the rest of the participation in the scheme. These participants voluntarily 
chose to become involved through a financial incentive made available by the 
government, with payment of the incentive conditional on allowances held by the 
participant being at least equal to total annual emissions. Another allowed method of 
entry into the Emissions Trading Scheme was through an approved emission reduction 
project—a defined activity that led to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Target 
holders were able to use credits earned from a reduction project to meet obligations 
within the trading scheme. Lastly, entry was allowed by having a participant, who may 
not have wished to take on a specified reduction target, simply open a trading account. 
These participants may have included environmental groups who may have wished to 
store allowances in order to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions.  
Participation in the Emissions Trading Scheme obviously differed between 
Agreement and Direct Participants. Agreement Participants had relatively little 
requirements—they participated in the scheme using their targets that were 
predetermined in their Agreement, thus they were not required to compile baseline data 
or take on any different target in order to participate. If the Agreement Participant chose 
to accept the 80% discount on the Climate Change Levy, then they were not allowed to 
also receive the financial incentive payment that Direct Participants qualified for. 
 37 
Participation in the Emissions Trading Scheme for Direct Participants was a bit more 
involved than participation for Agreement Participants. First of all, in order to receive the 
financial incentive payment, participants had to bid for a share of the £215 million 
incentive payment through an auction held in March 2002. In order to place a bid, the 
participant had to specify the reduction in annual emissions from the baseline that they 
planned to make by the end of the scheme in 2006. The reduction would then be divided 
into five equal annual targets over 2002 to 2006. As long as the participants were able to 
reach their specified annual targets, they would receive an annual payment. Another 
requirement for Direct Participants included the identification of the Source List, which 
consisted of the sources that the participant intended to bring into the scheme. Lastly and 
most importantly, participants were required to calculate their baseline, which would, in 
turn, determine their emission reduction target. The baseline was calculated based on 
historic emission levels—it is the average annual emissions in the three years up to and 
including the year 2000. Of course, it should be noted that the baseline would not 
necessarily turn out to be equal to total average annual emissions over the baseline period 
from all sources on a participant’s Source List. This inequality results because 
participants had the option of leaving out sources with emissions that were less than the 
Size Threshold (10,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent or 1% of the Source List 
total), meaning that participants could reduce their administrative costs by leaving 
sources out of the Baseline that had low levels of emissions over the Baseline period and 
were likely to remain low.  
As previously noted, the financial incentive payments for Direct Participants were 
determined based on the bid that the participant placed at the auction in March 2002. A 
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“Descending Clock” style auction was used to allocate the money. Bidders were required 
to submit the quantity, in tonnes of CO2 equivalent, of emission reductions at the stated 
price that they were prepared to take on for the length of the program. When the auction 
was over, the auctioneer announced the clearing price, which was the amount that each 
bidder would receive for each tonne of CO2 equivalent that they bid into the auction. The 
auction did not ask for bids greater than £100 per tonne of CO2 equivalent in order to 
limit the preparation costs for participants.70 Participants were also not allowed to bid to 
claim any more than 10% of the total incentive money. Defra (Department of 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs in the UK) described the rationale of the incentive 
payment as follows: since Direct Participants bid based on their annual levels of emission 
reductions, the incentive was applied to the additional reduction achieved in each year.71
 
Allowance allocation, trading and transfers also differed between Agreement and 
Direct Participants. Agreement Participants operated on a baseline-and-credit system as 
opposed to the cap-and-trade system that Direct Participants functioned under. 
Agreement Participants received allowances at the end of each compliance period (also 
known as the “milestone year”) as long as they reduced their energy use or emissions 
(depending on the agreement they entered into) below their target level. The amount of 
allowances allocated was dependent upon the amount of over-achievement by the 
participant, and participants were also allowed to trade allowances between themselves 
and with Direct Participants in order to reach target levels. If an Agreement Participant 
under-achieved its target level, they would not be able to receive any allowances, but 
rather would have to buy the number of allowances required before the end of the 
reconciliation period.  
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Conversely, Direct Participants operated under a cap-and-trade scheme. Participants 
received allowances matching their emissions cap for the forthcoming compliance period 
as long as they held allowances that were at least equal to their emissions for the previous 
compliance period. After the allocation, participants were able to sell allowances, as long 
as they held allowances equal to their actual verified emissions by the end of the 
reconciliation period. 
The rules for allowance trades and transfers were quite similar to those found in the 
US Acid Rain Program, but with a few key differences. Trades could take place between 
any participants in the scheme, and unlimited banking was allowed. A unique aspect of 
the UK program regards a mechanism called the “gateway,” which was put in place 
because of the existence of absolute and relative targets for Agreement Participants, 
though it should be noted that the majority of Agreement Participants operated under a 
relative target (meaning their reduction targets were expressed as per unit of output, 
rather than an absolute tonne reduction). The gateway ensured that there was no net 
transfer of allowances from the relative to the absolute sector; all allowances that were 
transferred into the absolute sector from the relative sector would need to pass through 
the gateway, which counted the total cumulative transfers. Relative sector participants 
were only allowed to transfer allowances out of the absolute sector when there had been a 
net flow into the relative sector. The gateway was put into place so that trading between 
the absolute and relative sectors would not erode the effectiveness of the trading scheme 
in terms of control of overall emissions. In other words, if firms in the relative sector 
exceeded their reduction targets and thus sold permits to the absolute sector, then 
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emissions in the absolute sector could rise. In order to prevent this rise in emissions, the 
gateway was put into place to restrict the flow of allowances between sectors.  
Agreement Participants were not required to report their emissions to the ETA 
(Environmental Transport Association) since they had their own set of reporting and 
verification rules within their agreement. However, certain information regarding the 
behavior of Direct Participants was available to the public in order to ensure efficient 
trading: the targets and initial allowance allocation of all Direct Participants, account 
holders and contact details, a transaction log with information regarding all transfers over 
the previous compliance period, the total baseline and annual emissions of all Direct 
Participants, the compliance status of all Direct Participants, and annual credit allocation 
to all UK-based projects. Direct Participants were required to report their emissions at the 
end of each compliance period, and if there were any discrepancies, participants had until 
the end of the reconciliation period to obtain the necessary amount of allowances to cover 
their excess emissions. At the end of each year, allowances that matched up to total 
emissions would be transferred into the government’s “retirement” account. If a 
participant did not hold sufficient allowances to cover their emissions by the end of the 
reconciliation period, they would not receive the financial incentive payment, their 
allowance allocation in the following period would be reduced, and they would incur a 
financial penalty. If the participant did not hold enough allowances at some point during 
the scheme (in other words, they received the financial incentive payment in the past), 
they would be required to repay past payments with interest; this punishment was in place 
so that participants would feel compelled to stay in the scheme for the entire four years 
and not leave after receiving payment. However, if a participant did choose to withdraw 
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from the scheme before its conclusion in 2006, they would be required to repay all 
previous payments with interest. Overall, it seems that the financial incentive payment 
and the threat of a penalty for non-compliance functioned well throughout the scheme, 
since all Direct Participants exhibited compliance and even over-compliance.  
 
Part III: Evaluation 
The UK Emissions Trading Scheme was implemented as a pilot scheme in order to 
test design options for a wide-scale greenhouse gas trading program. This part of the 
chapter will examine three main areas of the program—emission reductions, the 
efficiency of the allowance market and determination of an allowance price, and overall 
compliance and participation, in order to determine the general economic efficiency of 
the scheme. The chapter will concentrate mainly on Direct Participants, since the required 
reductions for Agreement Participants widely differed based on the various agreements 
entered into by those involved.  
 
Figure 2.172  Note: VA=Voluntary Agreement 
As far as emission reductions are concerned, Direct Participants were extremely 
successful, with 17 out of the 32 participants over-achieving their targets in the second 
 42 
year of the scheme. Figure 2.1 illustrates the million tonnes of CO2 equivalent surplus 
that resulted from Direct Participants emitting significantly less than their target levels, 
before six participants concluded a voluntary agreement with Defra to take on additional 
reductions. It can be seen that actual emissions were well below the amount of allocated 
allowances excluding the Voluntary Agreement. In 2002, for instance, actual emissions 
were measured at roughly 26 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent, while the allocation of 
allowances accounted for almost 30 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent—thus there was an 
excess of allowances. In fact, before the Voluntary Agreement of November 2004, excess 
allowances cumulatively totaled roughly 7.5 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent. Figure 2.1 
clearly shows that the Voluntary Agreement helped to reconcile this surplus—by 2004, 
actual allocations and actual emissions were roughly equal.  
Only two participants fell short of their targets in the first year of the scheme; 
however, overall, the group exceeded their target by a factor of almost 5. Still, by the end 
of the scheme, all Direct Participants were able to surpass their stated commitment of a 
3.96 million tonne reduction of CO2 equivalent. In addition, carbon dioxide emissions 
alone fell by 1.5%, with all six greenhouse gases falling by 1.7% in the year 2007, after 
the conclusion of the Emissions Trading Scheme.73 Emission reductions were achieved in 
a variety of ways, including abatement through indirect (i.e. electricity) and direct 
emissions. Dynamic efficiency was also achieved; participants claimed that they achieved 
reductions through the installation of emissions abatement equipment, as well as through 
modifications to the ways existing pieces of equipment were used (such as optimizing 
energy use).74 
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Appraisals of the program performed by economic consulting firms have found that 
there was some error in the calculations of baseline emissions for Direct Participants, and 
many participants’ emission levels were below their baselines at the start of the scheme in 
2002. The National Audit Office concluded that it was relatively easy for Direct 
Participants to overachieve in emission reductions because of the informational problems 
that compromised the baseline calculations.75 The over-generosity in baseline 
calculations explains the surplus of allowances that resulted in 2004, with an accumulated 
allowance bank of around 10 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent by the end of 2004. 
Concern mounted that the large bank was the primary cause for the low market value of 
allowances that existed76, and Defra announced in November 2004 that the six largest 
sources of over-compliance had agreed to take on additional reductions, totaling 8.9 
million tonnes of CO2 equivalent, in order to shrink the surplus of allowances. In addition 
to miscalculated baseline emissions, the verification process for some participants’ 
baselines took longer than anticipated, resulting in a delay in allocations. ENVIROS 
Consulting claims that this delay may have played a role in the relatively high allowance 
price that resulted in the beginning of the program in October 2002.  
Despite the two-month delay, the March 2002 auction was, for the most part, hailed 
as a success by both Defra and the Direct Participants.77 A survey taken of Direct 
Participants indicates that many of them were drawn to the program by the incentive 
payment, and the costs for preparing for the auction were low. Respondents also said that 
the opportunity for learning was successful, which was one of the main intentions of the 
pilot program. Much of the criticism came from politicians, who claimed that a better 
deal may have been available at a lower price, and that the incentive payments should 
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have been reduced once the government realized that there would be a somewhat low 
level of participation in the scheme. The only criticism from participants was that the 
rules could have been a bit simpler, and that more time was needed to fully understand 
the requirements of the program before committing to participate.  
The majority of external trades took place around the Agreement Participants’ 
Milestone periods—January 2003 and January 2005—most likely so that the majority of 
participants could reconcile their emissions with the necessary amount of allowances. It 
is interesting to note what the incentives for trading may have been for purposes of 
determining static efficiency; in particular, has the emissions trading scheme been 
effective in providing flexibility to individual firms, and have firms, in turn, taken 
advantage of such flexibility? Overall, evidence has shown that a considerable amount of 
trading has taken place throughout the scheme, in a reasonably liquid market with broad 
participation.78 Out of approximately 6032 potential traders, 1397 firms participated in at 
least one trade during the first three years of the scheme, with 176,000 allowances traded 
per month during this time. Throughout the scheme there were usually more buyers than 
sellers, with 1348 buyers vs. 171 sellers in the first year of trading. Smith & Swierzbinski 
(2006) show that the reallocation of abatement from high-cost to lower-cost sources 
illustrates the existence of static efficiency within the program.79 This reallocation of 
abatement also attempted to satisfy the equimarginal principle—abatement was allocated 
in a cost minimizing way because lower-cost sources shouldered the majority of 
abatement. In addition, Shell, Ineos Fluor, and Rhodia—the three principal sellers in the 
program—made relatively large contributions to the November 2004 Voluntary 
Agreement, which suggests that they may have had lower abatement costs. The 
 45 
movement of trades going principally in one direction, as previously shown with 
companies with lower abatement costs being identified as principal sellers, suggests static 
efficiency. Smith & Swierzbinski (2006) formulated a model to test this theory, since 
there were still a good number of trades made by firms moving in both directions. Smith 
& Swierzbinski (2006) looked at the prevalence of two-way trading and its relationship 
with trading frequency across the sample as a whole by measuring bi-directional trading 
as: 
B = (S + P)− | S − P |
S + P
 
where S represents sales of allowances and P represents purchases of allowances. Using 
data regarding the total number of transactions made in the first three years, they found 
that 92% of all firms trading in the scheme traded almost entirely in a single direction, 
confirming the existence of static efficiency.80 
 The evolution of the price of allowances, shown by Figure 2.2, is particularly 
interesting given that the price that allowances traded for ended up being much smaller 
than the clearing price of £17.79 obtained at the auction in March 2002. In April 2002, 
allowances were only trading at £5, and they then rose to a peak of £12 in October 2002, 
most likely because of the delay in allocations. The price then fell again to only £2 in 
2003, rose briefly to £4 in 2004, and dropped back down to £2 in 2005. An important 
question to ask is why did prices fluctuate so much, and why were they so much lower 
than expected? The National Audit Office and ENVIROS Consulting claim that the initial 
price peak in October 2002 reflected the shortage of allowances that resulted from the 
delay in allowance allocations.81 NAO also lists the demand by Agreement Participants 
for allowances to meet their targets and uncertainty on the part of all participants about 
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the amount of allowances needed as other contributors to the price peak in October. A 
possible explanation for the subsequent drop in prices is the publishing of the NAO report 
in 2004, which could have created an expectation of the later tightening of allowance 
supply, further inducing firms to reduce their overall allowance supply.82 
 
Figure 2.283 
 In terms of compliance, it is important to examine the incentives to abate on the 
part of polluters, especially since entrance into the UK’s Emissions Trading Scheme was 
voluntary. For Direct Participants, the incentive is relatively straightforward since they 
were paid a financial incentive payment in return for reductions in emissions. All 
participants were offering abatement at a price of £17.79 per tonne at the final auction 
price. Direct Participants were given a choice, as soon as the auction bids were translated 
into contractual obligations, to either abate on their own or buy allowances in the market. 
Thus, the incentive for marginal abatement was given by the market price of allowances. 
Firms that had committed to undertake abatement that was less costly than the auction 
price of £17.79, but more costly than the market price of £2-£4 would have been inclined 
to minimize costs by purchasing allowances rather than abating on their own.  
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For Agreement Participants, one must examine the incentive to conclude a 
Climate Change Agreement, which is shown by Figure 2.3. In terms of examining the 
cost and benefit of entering an Agreement, the benefit to Agreement Participants was the 
80% discount on the Climate Change Levy, while the cost was the amount of abatement 
required. Without an incentive to reach an agreement, the firm’s level of emissions is 
represented by point Q0, and Q1 shows where emissions would be if the firm was subject 
to the full Climate Change Levy at rate L. Q1 may therefore be thought of as the baseline 
for negotiating an agreement, and it is clear that a firm would choose to emit at Q2 if 
offered an 80% discount on the Levy. Area (a+b) represents additional abatement costs 
that result from reducing emissions from Q1 to Q2. As long as area (a+b) is greater than 
area (b+c), which shows the reduction in Levy payments, then it is worthwhile for the 
firm to reduce emissions to Q2 and receive the discount on the Levy in return. Of course, 
the amount of abatement required from each firm would have depended on the slope of 
the marginal abatement cost curve and the level of Levy payments in absence of an 
agreement. Due to asymmetric information between the government and firms, the 
government was not necessarily able to ask for the theoretical optimal value of abatement 
from Agreement Participants. In terms of the existence of a marginal abatement incentive 
for Agreement Participants, firms faced an abatement incentive that was given by the 
market price of an allowance. Fortunately, it is clear that an incentive to abate existed for 
both Direct and Agreement Participants.  
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Figure 2.384 
 Although no analyses have yet been conducted in regards to the cost effectiveness 
of the program, in terms of comparing cost savings from trading with cost savings from a 
counterfactual regulatory program, lessons can certainly be drawn from design aspects of 
the UK Emissions Trading Scheme. In addition, it is beneficial to examine the UK’s 
integration into the international emissions trading scheme that currently exists within the 
European Union, since international emissions trading is certainly a possibility for the US 
in the future. In brief, the EU Emissions Trading Program was first introduced in October 
2003 after a proposal for international emissions trading had been mentioned in 2001, and 
the scheme was up and running rather quickly by January 2005. Thus, negotiations 
regarding the design of the program were taking place as the UK Climate Change 
Programme was starting out. As mentioned previously, the UK government had treated 
their Emissions Trading Scheme as a sort of trial run in order to prepare UK firms for 
their eventual integration into the EU scheme.  
Unfortunately, many analysts, particularly Sorrell (2003), have agreed that the UK 
Climate Change Programme was incompatible with the EU Emissions Trading Program 
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because of differences in design features of each scheme.85 In fact, the UK had chosen to 
allow several installations covered by Climate Change Agreements as well as the Trading 
Scheme in general to temporarily opt out of the EU program while some of these design 
issues were properly sorted out—officially, the UK was given until the end of the UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme in 2006 to resolve any issues. Most of the issues surround the 
Climate Change Levy and the Climate Change Agreements because they extend beyond 
2006 (the Climate Change Agreements currently run until 2013) and are also dependent 
upon each other for success. Since the UK’s Emissions Trading Scheme ended in 2006, 
this part of the program does not really come into conflict with the EU scheme, as Direct 
Participants would have been able to join the EU scheme starting in 2007. However, there 
are still notable differences between the two schemes that would cancel out any “early 
advantage” that UK firms thought they would have by gaining experience in an emissions 
trading scheme. In particular, the UK scheme controlled the emissions of a basket of 
greenhouse gases, whereas the EU scheme deals solely with carbon dioxide emissions. 
The UK program was also voluntary with a financial incentive payment, whereas the EU 
program is mandatory with the only incentive being a penalty for non-compliance. The 
UK program does not include the electricity industry, but rather applies the Climate 
Change Levy to electricity outputs, whereas the EU scheme includes the electricity 
industry in its cap-and-trade program just like other industrial sectors. Lastly, the time 
periods of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
were in conflict. As stated before, the UK scheme ended in 2006, while the EU scheme 
began in 2005 and runs to 2007 and 2012 in two phases. In 2008, the UK finally did join 
the EU scheme and held its first auction for allowances in November of that year in order 
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to participate in Phase II of the scheme. As of March 2009, the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) has laid out several possibilities for changes to the Climate 
Change Agreements, mainly because they intend to extend the Agreements to 2017. The 
DECC is currently taking suggestions from interested parties, but it has also already made 
its own suggestions. Some considerations include whether or not Climate Change 
Agreements should continue to allow the option of relative or absolute targets (since the 
EU Emissions Trading Program operates under an absolute cap), whether or not the 
Agreements should include the option of setting targets in terms of energy use or carbon 
emissions, whether targets should be set annually as opposed to every 2 years as they are 
now, and whether targets should be split where there is an overlap between the 
Agreements and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. In any case, sufficient further work 
needs to be done when considering the future of Climate Change Agreements and their 
compatibility or potential overlap with the EU scheme. 
In thinking more about the UK’s integration into the EU scheme, particular interest is 
placed on the future value of allowances that have been banked by UK firms over the life 
of the scheme. Smith & Swierzbinski (2006) note that the value of allowances in the 
beginning of the EU scheme would have been heavily influenced by expectations about 
allowance supply and demand in the future.86 Expectations could be, in turn, affected by 
the future course of policy in terms of the future of the UK scheme, whether or not UK 
allowances will be converted into EU allowances, etc. These expectations could certainly 
affect the future of allowance prices, as well as the perceived risk of holding allowances 
due to uncertainty. Smith & Swierzbinski (2006) predict that the realized incompatibility 
of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme with the EU Emissions Trading Scheme may have 
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reduced the value of UK allowances, largely because allowances prices in the EU scheme 
so far have been substantially higher than those in the UK scheme.87 The difficult 
situation that the UK has faced in regards to integrating themselves into the EU trading 
program is certainly something to take into consideration. If the US decides to implement 
a national emissions trading program one day and then later participate in international 
trading, they will need to be careful in designing a national program and take care of 
compatibility. In addition, the US already has several regional trading programs in the 
Northeast and Midwest. If the US decides the implement a national program, they will 
need to take these regional programs into consideration. 
Despite the difference in governmental structure, valuable lessons may be taken from 
the UK Emissions Trading Scheme for future design of US climate change policy. The 
UK program was relatively successful for a pilot scheme, and the considerations that the 
country took into account concerning design features of a greenhouse gas program will 
be useful for the US’s program design.  
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Chapter Three: Lessons Learned for US Climate Change Policy 
 
 Chapter Three will focus on design aspects of the US Acid Rain Program and the 
UK Emissions Trading Scheme that may help shed light on the development of a national 
cap-and-trade program for combating climate change in the US. Part I will focus on the 
history of climate change policy from the perspective of the US; Part II will discuss 
program design issues regarding different types of market mechanisms, mainly permits 
and taxes; and Part III will reconsider the US and UK trading programs in the context of 
design aspects for a future national US program. The chapter will conclude with Part IV 
which discusses the future of US climate policy, in particular a recommendation for a 
future US greenhouse gas trading scheme, after taking into account the successes and 
failures of the Acid Rain Program as well as the UK’s Emissions Trading Scheme. It 
should be noted that greenhouse gas emissions differ widely from SO2 emissions, 
however certain design features of the Acid Rain Program are worth evaluating, 
especially since the program has largely been hailed as a success in environmental policy 
overall. 
 
Part I: The History 
 Although the US may be considered one of the leaders in using market-based 
instruments to deal with environmental issues because of the cap-and-trade system used 
to combat acid rain, the country has also been considered to be the world’s “leading 
laggard” in global warming issues.88 Although the US emits nearly a quarter of all 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases, the government has refused to commit to any binding 
targets or timetables for reducing emissions. The US did become a signatory of the Kyoto 
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Protocol in 1998 under President Clinton; however, Clinton never submitted the treaty to 
the Senate for ratification, and, in 2001, the Bush Administration refused to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol, thus rejecting the assigned 7% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
from 1990 levels. President George W. Bush did not submit the Protocol to the Senate for 
ratification on the grounds that the required reductions would put a strain on the US 
economy, uncertainties were present in climate change policy, and China (currently the 
world’s largest gross emitter of CO2 emissions) was exempt from the Protocol 
requirements. The US government has expressed further concerns about competing 
nations who may not have the same climate change policy as the US—any industry that 
is required to reduce emissions and may find their feedstock or energy bills increasing 
due to the pass-through of costs by suppliers may be less competitive and thus lose global 
market share and jobs to competitors in countries that do not have as strict of a climate 
change policy.89 The government worries that their own emission reductions would be 
counteracted by increased production in less regulated countries, a concept known as 
“carbon leakage.”90 As a result of these concerns, the US has thus far been hesitant to 
implement any sort of quantitative climate change policy. It should be noted, however, 
that despite the government’s weariness concerning the Kyoto Protocol, President Bush 
did express optimism about a technological solution for addressing climate change. 
 In order to understand the context in which the US would be formulating a 
climate change policy, it is necessary to consider the overall history of the issue, without 
repeating what has already been discussed in Chapter Two of the paper in regards to the 
history of policy. The greenhouse gas effect had been calculated as far back as the 1890s, 
however scientists did not begin to test the theory of global warming until the 1950s, 
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when they discovered that the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was 
rising steadily. By the 1960s, scientists began to publicly warn about human-induced 
climate change in popular literature, although it was not until 1979 that the World 
Meteorological Organization was formed and the UN Environment Program established 
the World Climate Program. In addition, the first World Climate Conference convened 
that year. Close to a decade later, the particularly hot summer of 1988 brought about 
widespread media attention to the issue of global warming, and Dr. James Hansen 
(director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies) subsequently gave a testimony to the Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources stating that human activities were certainly a major cause of climate 
change. Hansen later made a statement to the New York Times, where he proclaimed, “It 
is time to stop waffling so much and say the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse 
effect is here.”91 Action was quick, and weeks after the testimony an international group 
of scientists and policymakers met in Toronto, calling for a 20% reduction in global 
carbon emissions by 2005. This 20% reduction target had no economic or scientific 
analysis at its base, however, and many governments were still skeptical, which is why 
the IPCC was established in December of that year.  
 By 1992, the UNFCCC, established in 1990, had been signed by more than 150 
nations, including the US, in Rio de Janeiro. The UNFCCC called only for voluntary 
action, and no country made any sort of commitment to abating greenhouse gas 
emissions. In addition, the US wished to keep emissions targets and timetables out of 
initial negotiations, due to George H.W. Bush’s position that abatement measures were 
too costly and that more scientific evidence was required before making “economic 
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sacrifices.”92 Instead, the US government promoted a non-binding goal of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions back to 1990 levels by the year 2000. This goal was not really 
enforced, however, and the government really only agreed to prepare inventories of their 
emissions and to adopt some sort of policy for future abatement and mitigation—overall, 
the climate change policy efforts made in 1992 were quite vague and poorly enforced.  
 In 1993, a new administration came to power under President Clinton, who 
proposed an energy consumption tax (which was later rejected by Congress) as well as a 
pledge to stabilize US greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2010. In order 
to stand by such a pledge, a Climate Change Action Plan was announced in October of 
that year, however it was based largely on voluntary action rather than mandatory targets. 
By 1996, the US government publicly supported the eventual implementation of 
mandatory emission reduction targets, which paved the way for the government’s signing 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. The Senate, however, greatly criticized the signing, and 
had also previously voted in favor the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in July 1997 by a vote of 
95-0, which instructed the President to refrain from signing any climate protocols that did 
not include developing countries in the prescribed actions, or any protocols that would 
adversely affect the US economy. A new administration in 2001 once again saw a change 
in the US government’s outlook on climate change policy. As noted previously, President 
Bush rejected the ratification of the Protocol in March 2001. The Protocol received 
criticism outside the government as well, with many American economists, such as 
Barrett (2003), claiming that the regime was inefficient by requiring high emission 
reductions in the short term while not making any specifications in regards to the longer 
future.93 The Administration did reaffirm its support for the UNFCCC and called for 
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additional scientific research to be done on the climate change issue. The government 
continued to reject mandatory reduction requirements, and instead the Administration 
promoted “climate-friendly” technology and announced a voluntary global warming plan 
in 2002 that called for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP by 18% 
in the year 2012. The plan was criticized, however, as still making overall emissions 30% 
above 1990 levels, given the President’s assumptions about economic growth. In 
addition, critics noted that 18% was close to the amount that normal modernization and 
improvement had achieved in the previous decade, and that the voluntary nature of the 
plan would produce uncertainties for implementing planning by other members of the 
UNFCCC.  
 New efforts were made in 2003 with the Climate Stewardship Act, proposed by 
Senators McCain and Lieberman. The Act called for climate policy that covered much of 
the economy, and addressed the transportation sector in an “upstream” manner by 
requiring oil refiners to hold allowances for their emissions. It allowed for emissions 
offsets, banking and borrowing, and it contained provisions for international trading. The 
Act was defeated in the Senate, however, by a vote of 43-55, and Congress placed it on 
hold in 2004, with plans for post-Kyoto negotiations dismissed as being “premature.”94 
 Although there has been a lack of enthusiasm for climate policy within the federal 
government, certain corporate and state initiatives have still taken place over the years. 
Some companies have chosen to prepare themselves for a future stricter climate policy 
that they believe is practically inevitable by designing programs to mitigate risks 
involved with climate policy.95 As of 2005, approximately 60 US corporations have 
instituted their own greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in order to gain expertise 
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as to the impact that future regulatory policies may have on their companies. An example 
of a corporate initiative is the Chicago Climate Exchange, also known as CCX. Trading 
done in the Acid Rain Program mostly influenced the design of CCX. CCX included a 
trading pilot program for greenhouse gas emissions sources and offset projects in the US, 
Canada, Mexico, and Brazil. It was self-regulatory and designed to be governed by the 
members, which included 60 businesses, state and local governments and 10 other 
organizations. The program was, of course, voluntary, and those who chose to be 
members made a legally binding commitment to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
by 4% below the average of their 1998-2001 baselines by the year 2006.  
 Certain states have also chosen to take initiative and develop their own climate 
policies for several reasons. For one, some states wish to appease the public’s concerns 
about the impacts of climate change—with the start of the 21st century, environmental 
issues, and especially the issue of climate change, have been given increased media 
attention, leading to public demand for action. In addition, states may wish to influence 
national policy in a way that might benefit their own companies, and they also may wish 
to promote innovative technologies and encourage economic development benefits. Still, 
there also exist certain issues with early action on the part of the states. For one, each 
state must face the possibility of the free-rider problem—if a state or region adopts a 
climate change policy to address their share of the problem, their efforts would be futile if 
other states do not contribute anything. In addition, the same problem of “carbon 
leakage”—discussed earlier in terms of international programs—also exists for state and 
regional programs. Mandatory requirements in one state or region may cause a shift in 
economic activity and emissions to another state or region that does not have any 
 58 
mandatory requirements. Lastly, states’ hopes that their policies may influence a national 
policy may not be realized if a state program will not necessarily work correctly for a 
national circumstance. Despite these issues, regional programs still exist in the Northeast, 
Mid-Atlantic, and the West Coast. In April 2003, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
a Northeast and Mid-Atlantic cap-and-trade program, was launched and is scheduled to 
begin in 2009. The program includes the distribution of allowances to cover emissions, 
allocating 25% of the allowances for a “public benefit” purpose in order to mitigate the 
impacts of the program for taxpayers, as well as to promote low- or no-carbon 
technologies. The scheme also includes the development of an effective offset program, 
which allows for experimentation with a set of offset project types. Lastly, the program 
allows for international linkages—it includes a provision that would allow the use of 
allowances from an internationally recognized trading regime if allowance prices hit a 
$10 per ton trigger price for two years in a row. 
 In addition to the development of regional trading programs, several states have 
also taken the step of creating their own registries for greenhouse gas emissions. The 
benefit of such a measure is that it could help corporations identify the scope of their 
emissions and notice possible reductions that could be made. Further, the public aspect of 
the registry would raise awareness to the issue of climate change and emphasize those 
company leaders who are taking initiative in reducing their emissions. On the negative 
side, there is an inherent contradiction in voluntary registries.96 For one, if measurement 
and reporting requirements are too strict in an emissions reporting program, utilities will 
be discouraged from participating. On the other hand, if measurement and reporting 
requirements are too lenient, the resulting data may not be significant for a future 
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mandatory program. Still, the valuable experience that some states are getting with the 
development of registries will most likely be beneficial for a future national program. 
 
Part II: Price-based vs. Quantity-based Instruments 
 Given the nature of greenhouse gas emissions, it seems clear that a market-based 
mechanism is the ideal instrument to use for an efficient climate change policy. For one, 
abatement costs vary widely across utilities, meaning that cost savings can result by 
allowing low-cost firms to do the majority of the abatement—the flexibility provided by 
market-based instruments can allow firms to abate more efficiently than a command-and-
control instrument could. It is also true that there is no distributional efficiency issue in 
regards to greenhouse gas emissions, in terms of “hot spots”—greenhouse gases are 
uniformly mixed pollutants, as mentioned previously, so a market-based instrument 
should work well since the location of abatement does not matter. 
While market mechanisms have gained much more acceptance among 
economists, politicians, and environmentalists since the emergence of the Acid Rain 
Program in the 1990s, there is still debate as to whether quantity-based (such as a cap-
and-trade scheme) or a price-based (such as a carbon tax) system works best for 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions. Early economic analysis concerning climate 
change policy tended to focus on the price-based instrument of a carbon tax because it 
was easier to model and implement.97 Although a carbon tax would be particularly 
efficient if the tax is set equal to the marginal climate-related damage from carbon 
combustion, the presence of uncertainty does not ensure this efficiency. In order to 
properly determine the most efficient policy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it is 
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necessary to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of both quantity-based and price-
based policies in relation to carbon policy. Sterner & Hammar (2005) identify three main 
concerns that should be kept in mind when considering instrument choice: efficiency, 
incentive compatibility, and distributional or equity concerns.98  
One of the main things to consider when choosing between a quantity-based and 
price-based instrument for controlling greenhouse gas emissions is the shape of the 
marginal damage curve. Of course, it is difficult to tell the true shape of the damage 
curve, which explains why economists often disagree on the matter. Greenhouse gases 
are stock pollutants, and for most stock pollutants, the marginal damage curve is flat, 
which would favor the use of a price-based scheme.99 A price-based scheme would be 
favorable under such circumstances because it is considered preferable to have the levels 
of emissions remain uncertain, as they would under a tax, as opposed to having the 
marginal price of emission reductions remain uncertain, as they would under a cap-and-
trade scheme. Having a well-defined price, as one would under a carbon tax, is 
advantageous because it avoids the potential for price volatility that could occur under a 
permit system. Parry & Pizer (2007) note that the existence of price volatility in 
allowance markets could prevent long-term capital and R&D investments in low-carbon 
technologies that have up-front costs, mainly because of the uncertainty that would exist 
concerning allowance prices.100 As a result, the well-defined price is a notable advantage 
of a price-based system such as a carbon tax. Kolstad (2000) points out, however, that a 
quantity-based regulation is preferred when damages demonstrate a “threshold effect.”101 
If damage from a particular pollutant rises above an established threshold, then a 
quantity-based system may be more effective as the reduction in emissions would be 
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known with certainty. Since damage from greenhouse gas emissions has recently been 
considered to be quite serious, it is possible that quantity-based regulation may be best 
for controlling emissions. 
Another method used for determining instrument choice is to evaluate the impact 
of unpredictable innovation on the policy scheme. Fischer (2005) found that the 
possibility of unpredictable abatement leading to uncertainty in abatement costs favors a 
price-based system.102 If abatement technology happens to develop rapidly over time, 
causing abatement costs to fall, a price-based system, such as a tax, would continue to 
provide a strong incentive for abatement as compared with a quantity-based system, such 
as a cap-and-trade program. Since the cap in emissions in a cap-and-trade scheme sets the 
total amount of abatement, firms will have no incentive to abate further after innovation. 
Thus, it is possible that policymakers will be unable to anticipate the probable amount of 
innovation on the part of firms while a scheme is in place, making a price-based system 
more appealing in the realm of uncertainties. Fischer also discusses the “adoption price 
effect” in a cap-and-trade system—as innovation lowers abatement costs for firms, the 
price of permits will fall, meaning that firms now have the less costly option of forgoing 
new technology and buying cheaper permits instead.103 The “adoption price effect” 
suggests that firms may not be as willing to pay for new technology under a quantity-
based system as they would under a price-based system. 
Despite the advantages of a price-based system in regards to innovation 
uncertainties, a quantity-based system, particularly a cap-and-trade system, has still been 
regarded as having many advantages as a policy instrument for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Stavins (2005) notes that in a permit system, there is an incentive for polluters 
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to identify themselves and their respective emission levels since they must do so in order 
to claim permits.104 Another advantage of a permit system is that cost-effectiveness can 
be achieved simultaneously with distributional equity—in the absence of low marginal 
transactions costs, the equilibrium allocation as well as the aggregate abatement costs are 
independent of the initial allocation.  
Ellerman (2005) has suggested that experience with permit systems thus far has 
demonstrated that they work—emissions trading systems have been successful in 
reducing the cost of abatement without detracting from the environmental goal.105 Both 
Carlson et al. (2000) and Ellerman et al. (2000) estimate cost savings of approximately 
50% from the Acid Rain Program. In addition, Ellerman (2005) notes that environmental 
performance is also improved under permit systems.106 Emissions were reduced by 
approximately 4 million tons in the first year of the Acid Rain Program, and Ellerman 
(2005) attributes the improved environment to the lack of regulatory requirements. In 
particular, the offset mechanism in a cap-and-trade scheme helps by allowing sources 
with relatively high costs to purchase reductions (permits) from sources with lower costs. 
Ellerman (2005) concludes by stating that emissions trading is especially appropriate for 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions due to the uniform nature of the pollutant and the 
long lives of greenhouse gases. These two characteristics make the spatial or temporal 
considerations that were present with acid rain non-existent, and the scope of an 
emissions trading program to be less limited. 
Although there are some advantages to a price-based market instrument, such as a 
tax on pollution, experience with cap-and-trade programs has shown that they can be 
quite successful in reducing emissions at least cost. It has been established that a price-
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based system is beneficial in providing a well-defined price in order to avoid price 
volatility that may impede future R&D investments. In addition, if unpredictable 
innovation takes place, a price-based system is beneficial because it continues to provide 
an incentive to abate even after innovation. However, certain design features may be 
added to a cap-and-trade scheme that can cause it to have similar advantages as a carbon 
tax would. For instance, one of the advantages of a tax on carbon is that revenue may be 
generated for the government. The same effect can take place under a cap-and-trade 
scheme that uses an auction for the initial allocation of allowances. In addition, Parry & 
Pizer (2007) note that including a safety valve mechanism and the ability to bank 
allowances in the program can diminish the potential for price volatility under a cap-and-
trade scheme.107 The safety valve would essentially place a cap on permit prices, which 
could be triggered if the demand for permits and abatement costs are high. The safety 
valve would allow firms to buy as many permits as they wish from the government at a 
pre-determined price. Banking, as previously defined, would allow firms to bank 
allowances for use in the future. By allowing these two mechanisms into a cap-and-trade 
scheme, the scheme would work quite similarly to a tax system, as the mechanisms 
would help to stabilize the price of permits. 
 
Part III: Design Issues 
While tax systems and cap-and-trade systems have the potential to work in much 
the same way, giving a cap-and-trade system some of the main advantages that a tax 
system traditionally enjoys, a tax system would most likely be more difficult to 
implement given certain political issues. Imposing new taxes is always a difficult 
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measure, especially in a weak economy. Without even mentioning the possibility of a 
carbon tax, President Obama repeated his support for a cap-and-trade policy for 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions in a speech made on Earth Day (April 22, 2009), 
stating that, in his opinion, capping emissions is the best way to regulate carbon 
pollution.108 In addition, past experience with cap-and-trade programs, especially in the 
US Acid Rain Program and the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, has proven successful. 
Thus, I suggest using a cap-and-trade system for combating greenhouse gas emissions.  
After determining that a cap-and-trade scheme is the best instrument to use for 
combating climate change, it is necessary to identify specific design elements of the 
scheme. First, there is the choice of attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as a 
whole, such as a basket of greenhouse gases, or just CO2 emissions. Although all 
greenhouse gases contribute to climate change, CO2 is the most prevalent greenhouse gas 
and thus contributes most to climate change. Stowell (2005) notes that pollutant(s) 
covered will be based on how well the emissions can be measured with accuracy, since a 
high degree of accuracy is required to keep the environmental integrity of the program 
intact.109 The UK Emissions Trading Scheme required reductions in a basket of all six 
greenhouse gases, measured in CO2 equivalence, and there were no reports of emissions 
being difficult to measure with accuracy. However, it is also important to keep in mind 
that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme only covers CO2 emissions rather than all six 
greenhouse gases, and if the US plans to engage in any international trading in the future, 
it might be beneficial to cover only CO2 emissions in order to stay compatible with other 
schemes. Indeed, one of the reasons that the UK temporarily opted out of the EU scheme 
is because their program measured a basket of greenhouse gases rather than just CO2.  
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The natural next question concerns the participants in the scheme—which sectors 
and sources will the scheme cover, and what are the entry requirements for each 
participant? Stowell (2005) notes that a domestic scheme may only be able to cover a 
limited number of sources and sectors due to the high administrative costs associated 
with implementing an economy-wide scheme.110 The electricity sector should be covered 
regardless of whether the scheme is economy-wide or not, since it is the source of 
approximately 33% of carbon emissions in the US economy as of May 2008. Further, in 
order to achieve full compliance with the Kyoto Protocol in a cost-effective way, the 
electricity sector would need to provide between 68-75% of total emission reductions in 
the economy. Burtraw et al. (2001) claim that covering the electricity sector should be 
considered a first step to an economy-wide approach for climate policy.111 On the other 
hand, a larger number of participants will ensure more cost-efficiency, as long as this 
balances out against the higher administrative costs. Either way, there are several 
important points concerning the sources covered, including the fact that they must be 
clearly defined within each sector, they should have a range of abatement costs, and they 
should have the ability to accurately monitor their emissions. The UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme was voluntary, so it covered quite a wide range of sectors with the exception of 
the electricity industry, which was covered under the Climate Change Levy, and it also 
covered utilities in both the public and private sector. By having little restrictions on the 
types of sources which could be covered by the scheme, the program was able to gain an 
adequate amount of participation despite its voluntary nature—a little over 6000 firms 
chose to participate in the end. Thus, the sectors that the scheme will choose to cover will 
depend upon the administrative costs present in an economy-wide scheme versus the 
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increased cost-efficiency that results from including more participants. If a scheme has 
multiple phases, it is also possible that more sectors could be added to the coverage of the 
program as time goes on. 
A third design feature to consider is whether the program should be “upstream” or 
“downstream.” By upstream, it is meant that the obligation to reduce emissions is placed 
on the producers or importers of fossil fuels, and the traded commodity is the carbon 
content of those fossil fuels. Producers and importers would then pass down the cost of 
purchasing permits to consumers in the fossil fuel markets, creating a change in price for 
consumers as well as a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, by a 
downstream system, it is meant that the obligation to reduce is placed directly on the 
sources that emit the pollution from the fossil fuels consumed, such as large power 
generators. Sterner & Hammar (2005) claim that the decision between upstream and 
downstream depends upon the expected size and nature of transactions costs under a 
greenhouse gas trading system.112 If the scheme was going to be economy-wide, for 
instance, a downstream system is hardly ideal—the authorities would not be able to ask 
people to hold permits every time they wanted to get gas. While the Acid Rain Program 
is a downstream system, residential, commercial, transportation, and smaller industrial 
sectors do not contribute much to SO2 emissions, so the fact that the scheme directly 
targets emitters is not an issue. An upstream system for an economy-wide greenhouse gas 
trading program would also have lower administrative costs than a downstream system 
would, since a smaller number of utilities would be under regulation as part of an 
upstream system.113 Since the above sectors contribute quite a lot to greenhouse gas 
emissions, it is quite possible that the US may need to rely on an upstream system for 
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efficiency. The UK Emissions Trading Scheme was an upstream system and this element 
of the scheme seemed to work well—participants in the scheme were the producers or 
importers of fossil fuels who were asked to put together their own source lists. Overall, 
the decision between upstream and downstream seems to depend upon the size of the 
scheme—whether it is economy-wide or whether it will only cover certain sectors.  
Once the eligibility of participants is determined, the scheme must specify entry 
requirements for those who wish to participate. In particular, who is allowed to hold an 
account in the registry? In most schemes, including the US Acid Rain Program and the 
UK Emissions Trading Scheme, anyone is allowed to hold an account in the registry and 
trade permits. Environmental groups may wish to buy up allowances in order to force 
utilities to reduce emissions further. It is also necessary to determine how the baseline of 
emissions will be calculated for those participants covered under the scheme. Calculation 
of the baseline is actually quite important as it determines the initial allocation of permits 
if the scheme operates under a grandfathered system of allocating permits. Both the US 
Acid Rain Program and the UK Emissions Trading Scheme operated under a 
grandfathered system of allocation, and both suffered from calculation errors concerning 
the baseline. The baselines in the Acid Rain Program were based on 1989-1990 data, 
which ignored changes in the coal markets and the utilization of electric generating units 
in the intervening years—this caused the true counterfactual emissions for units in 1995-
1999 to be different. In particular, changes in the coal markets caused some units to 
switch to low-sulfur coal, and these units could then opt-in to the program and receive 
allowances in excess of their true baselines. Participants in the UK scheme also had their 
baselines calculated based on historic emission levels, in particular the participant’s 
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average annual emissions in the three years leading up to and including the year 2000. 
Still, many participants’ emission levels were below their baselines at the start of the 
scheme in 2002, suggesting an over-generosity in baseline calculation. This 
miscalculation led to a surplus of allowances in 2004, which may have caused the low 
market value of allowances during this time. The lesson learned from both the US and the 
UK schemes is that calculation of the baseline is quite important, and future schemes 
should pay even more attention to the accurate calculation of the baseline.  
Another important design feature of cap-and-trade schemes is the existence of 
opt-in and opt-out provisions. Opt-in provisions allow companies that are not initially 
covered by the trading scheme to voluntarily enter the program, making them subject to 
the same requirements as those units already covered. An opt-in provision was present in 
the Acid Rain Program for those sources who were not covered under Phases I and II, 
and the provision is actually considered to be one of the successes of the program by 
some.114 During Phase I of the scheme, an additional 111 units opted-in to the program 
and were able to receive allowances for the year(s) in which they chose to participate. 
Ellerman (2005) points out some issues with the opt-in provision in the Acid Rain 
Program, however, such as the fact that the provision was hampered by the cost of 
monitoring equipment required by the program.115 Each utility operating under the 
scheme was required to install rather expensive equipment used to continuously monitor 
emissions, and it is possible that some units chose not to opt into the program due to the 
relatively high transactions costs associated with joining the scheme. In addition, 
Ellerman notes that the units who decided to opt-in versus those who chose not to reveals 
an adverse selection problem. Units who expected their emissions to be lower than the 
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predetermined baseline tended to opt-in to the program, whereas units who expected their 
emissions to be higher chose not to opt-in.116 Overall, however, Ellerman’s analysis 
shows that the transactions costs and adverse selection problem did not threaten the 
overall integrity of the cap in the Acid Rain Program, and many of the units who chose to 
opt-in still contributed some cost savings to the program by abating their emissions. The 
UK Emissions Trading Scheme did not include an opt-in provision, which actually may 
have harmed the scheme in the end. Although 46 firms had originally signed up for the 
scheme as Direct Participants, only 32 ended up participating, with many of the firms 
claiming that there was not sufficient time for learning the rules of the scheme before 
committing to it.117 It is possible that an opt-in provision would have provided firms with 
more time to learn the rules so that the scheme could have enjoyed higher participation. 
In deciding whether or not to include an opt-in provision as part of a future climate 
change policy, it is important to consider the effect of any monitoring or other overhead 
costs that new participants would voluntarily be taking on. As long as the costs are 
relatively low, then the program could bring in significant voluntary participation, 
leading to increased cost savings. 
A program could also contain an opt-out provision, which would allow a 
company to remove itself from a trading scheme depending on established criteria. If the 
program is voluntary, however, it may be necessary to provide some sort of incentive to 
keep firms in the program for as long as possible. The UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
was voluntary, so firms could technically leave the scheme at any time. All Direct 
Participants stayed in the scheme for its entirety because of the financial incentive 
payment, which a firm could only receive if it stayed in the scheme until the end. A 
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future climate change policy may want to consider an opt-out provision for the advantage 
that it gives more flexibility to firms, however if many firms choose to exercise this 
option, it may do more harm to the scheme by making it less efficient.  
A further design feature to consider is implementation dates and the length of 
compliance periods. As noted previously, one of the complaints concerning the UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme is that participants were not given enough time to understand 
the rules and requirements of the program before committing to it—for future policy, it is 
important to take this into consideration, and to allow an appropriate amount of time 
before the scheme begins for firms to fully grasp how the scheme works. Another 
important decision concerns how many phases the scheme will be divided into. The Acid 
Rain Program had two phases, and many economists claim that the flexible timing of the 
program played an important role in its success.118 The UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
only had one phase, however it was meant to be a short pilot scheme to prepare firms for 
the EU scheme. If the US is considering international trading, it may be beneficial to 
form its implementation dates and compliance periods around those of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme and in line with the timing of the commitment periods of the Kyoto 
Protocol for uniformity purposes.  
Perhaps the most difficult question to ask about cap-and-trade design concerns  
the allowance allocation method. Raymond (2003) claims that the most important and 
controversial part of the design process is deciding on an initial allocation approach.119 
Burtraw et al. (2001) studied the cost-effectiveness of different allocation methods on the 
electricity sector and found that the initial allocation matters greatly because of its effect 
on electricity prices.120 Tietenberg (2006) also states that the distributional effects of a 
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cap-and-trade program depend upon whether permits are grandfathered or auctioned, and 
further whether revenues from a permit auction or indirect taxation from permit rents are 
used to cut payroll taxes, corporate taxes, or provide lump-sum transfers.121 Tietenberg 
(2006) extends this point further by pointing out that the initial allocation of allowances 
can determine the degree of cost-effectiveness that can be achieved by the program 
overall.122 This argument is demonstrated by the double dividend issue, where recycling 
the revenue from auctions can reduce welfare costs; also by the differential treatment of 
new sources under a grandfathered allocation, where new sources cannot be allocated 
permits based on historic emission levels in the same way existing sources are; by the 
new market power that can be created from the initial allocation by existing sources; by 
certain strategic considerations, such as the fact that some firms may increase their 
emissions just to qualify for more permits; and, lastly, by transactions costs, where 
trading can become inhibited and the market may not be able to overcome any cost-
effective deficiencies.  
The cap-and-trade schemes examined in this paper both freely allocated 
allowances based on historic emission levels. In the Acid Rain Program, the initial 
allocation was based on two main factors: historic fuel use and the emissions rate per unit 
of fuel use, based on a uniformly applied, agreed-upon emissions rate to cover all 
emitters. The Program ended up grandfathering all permits to one industry, which seemed 
to work well for SO2 emissions, but may not be equitable for carbon due to the 
widespread nature of the expected impacts of carbon policy.123 The UK Emissions 
Trading Scheme also used grandfathering for their initial allocation for Direct 
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Participants—the baseline, used to determine each firm’s emission reduction target, was 
calculated based on historic emission levels.  
Free allocation has gained a lot of political support over the years, which may 
explain why it is so often used in emissions trading. Besides being used in the US and the 
UK, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme has had its member countries almost exclusively 
allocate allowances freely, and oftentimes even over-allocate in favor of industries with 
competitive markets. The Australian government’s Green Paper recommended free 
allocation of allowances under its own proposed cap-and-trade program in order to assist 
greenhouse gas-intensive, trade-exposed industries. New Zealand also announced its 
intention to use free allocation in order to assist its industries. If allowances are freely 
allocated, then firms are able to retain rents associated with the higher output prices, and 
these rents would, in turn, offset other compliance costs that they incur. Thus, initial free 
allocation is popular politically because regulated interests are most often taken care of. It 
may be important to take this distributional advantage into consideration because firms 
are able to enjoy higher profits under a free allocation system—in fact, even only 
allocating less than one fifth of the permits is sufficient to keep profits up.124 Free 
allocation has other notable advantages besides being appealing politically, however. 
Ellerman (2005) believes that allocating allowances must be part of the solution.125 Free 
allocation ensures that greenhouse gas-intensive, trade-exposed industries will not 
necessarily be excluded from the cap-and-trade program so that cost-effective reductions 
may still be made, which would lower the overall cost of the program, as compared with 
an approach that exempts those industries.126 In addition, incorporating emissions in the 
cap from the start of the program can help industries become familiar with the carbon 
 73 
market and how the market works, as well as how to develop least-cost strategies for 
complying with reduction requirements. 
Still, economists have also identified several disadvantages with the free 
allocation approach. For one, Parry, Williams, & Goulder (1998) found that for a free 
allocation to be efficient, marginal benefits from abatement may need to be at a specific 
level, whereas an emissions tax or revenue-raising auction will be efficient regardless of 
the level of marginal benefits.127 Second, if the interests of certain regulated industries are 
taken into consideration under free allocation, then this implies higher costs for other 
sectors. For instance, marginal CO2 emission reductions may be more costly in the 
transport sector than reductions in the energy and industrial sectors. In addition, as stated 
before, the differential treatment of new sources under a free allocation system that likely 
uses grandfathering could pose unfair difficulties for new sources. In particular, new 
sources incur a higher financial burden, equal to the sum of abatement costs and permit 
costs, and studies have shown that this has slowed the introduction of new technology for 
these sources. Also, if firms are allocated more permits than they need to reach their 
reduction requirement, they could use these permits to gain market power and manipulate 
the market. Free initial allocation incorrectly assumes the absence of transactions costs, 
and can only be really durable if participants are constrained by regulations, so that the 
incentive to engage in cost-minimizing behavior still exists. Lastly, the incentive to 
innovate is less under a free allocation system because a fall in permit price lowers the 
value of the innovator’s allocated permits.128  
Significant consideration should be given to the above noted advantages and 
disadvantages of an initial free allocation. If an initial free allocation method is chosen 
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for a future climate change cap-and-trade program, the following two points should be 
studied. First of all, policymakers will need to decide what percentage of the total 
available allowances will be allocated to greenhouse gas-intensive, trade-exposed 
industries. “Windfall profits” are possible by some industries or sub-industries, so it must 
be decided what amount is necessary to compensate other industries, which of course 
varies from industry to industry. It is also true that allowance prices will change over time 
and will not necessarily track costs, so there is a good chance that some industries may be 
over-compensated, which would lower the efficiency of the program. A second point of 
concern should be given to the methodology and metrics used to apportion the free 
allowances among various industries and sub-industries. 
Recently, initial allocation by auction has received increased support from 
economists and politicians, particularly in the US. In an auction system, instead of the 
government determining the amount of allowances each firm will receive, firms are 
required to decide how many allowances they think they will need to cover its emissions, 
and then they must purchase them from the government in the auction. Buyers are pitted 
against each other in the auction to ensure that the auctioned item (the permits) goes to 
the user who values it the most. Auctions can be either revenue-raising or zero-revenue. 
From an efficiency perspective, it has been said that a program will be more efficient if 
the permits are auctioned and the revenues are used in an efficient manner. Sterner & 
Hammar (2005) claim that overall costs for climate policy could potentially be much 
lower as compared with free allocation if policymakers take advantage of the double 
dividend that exists in revenue recycling efforts.129 The Acid Rain Program, however, 
held a small auction after the initial allocation that was zero-revenue—the proceeds were 
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refunded on a proportional basis to the utilities from which the authorities collected 
allowances for the auction. This auction was held mainly to help out new sources that 
could not receive allowances in the initial free allocation, so it cannot necessarily be 
helpful in terms of formulating a policy that uses an auction as an initial primary means 
of allocation. 
Economists have discussed several different types of auction design, which can be 
divided into two main groups: sealed-bid auctions and ascending auctions. The 
differences between the two mainly concern the bidding method and subsequent price 
determination. In sealed-bid auctions with uniform pricing, bidders submit their demand 
schedules simultaneously with each winner paying the clearing price for permits. In an 
ascending auction, bidders may continuously change their bids so that the winners end up 
being those willing to pay the most for permits. The ascending clock auction is a type of 
ascending auction, and Cramton & Kerr (1998) found it to be the most efficient method 
of allocating allowances through an auction-based system.130 Bidders submit the quantity 
of permits they are willing to pay, based on the price given by the clock and the bidding 
ends once the quantity bid is less than the quantity available. This type of auction is quite 
similar to the auction employed under the Acid Rain Program, except that bidders only 
submit their desired quantity and no price, which eliminates any possibility of 
undesirable bid signaling. It is also similar to the UK’s auction used for the financial 
incentive payment because of the uniform pricing, however the UK’s auction was 
descending-clock, meaning that prices were ticked down from a large amount as opposed 
to starting at a low price and rising. 
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Certain studies, such as Burtraw et al. (2001) have found that initial allocation by 
auction is the most cost-effective approach; in fact, the model shows that the use of the 
auction is roughly one-half the cost to society of two other approaches examined 
(grandfathering and a generation performance standard).131 Policymakers are provided 
with more flexibility since the revenues from the auction can be used for various 
distributional or other needs. The Burtraw et al. (2001) study uses a model that 
redistributes the revenue to households, which is actually the least efficient use of the 
revenues, yet the auction was still be considered the best approach when compared with 
grandfathering and a generation performance standard.132 In addition, since the approach 
is more cost-effective, the allocation will have less of an effect on economic growth than 
alternative approaches, which is an important distributional benefit. It has also been 
estimated that the costs for the Acid Rain Program would have been approximately 25% 
less if allowances had been auctioned as opposed to freely allocated because revenues 
could have been used to finance reductions in some pre-existing taxes.133 
Once the allowance allocation method has been established, it is necessary to 
consider different trading options and requirements. A common feature of emissions 
trading schemes is the use of banking—the ability to save allowances for use in the 
future. Banking was allowed in both the US Acid Rain Program and the UK Emissions 
Trading Scheme, and studies have shown that it actually encouraged early reductions 
during Phase I of the Acid Rain Program due to the anticipation of potentially higher 
costs in Phase II.134 Baked emissions during Phase I totaled 11.65 million tons of 
emissions, meaning that 11.65 million tons of SO2 emissions were reduced ahead of 
schedule by about six years, on average. Banking is thus a response to the cost savings 
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possible by trading across years. Banking can also dampen price fluctuations—the Acid 
Rain Program experienced price fluctuations of no more than 3:1 as measured by the ratio 
of the highest observed price to the lowest. Price volatility can reflect the scope of 
potential spatial and temporal trading, and banking can be important when spatial trading 
is limited. The economic case for banking concerns the flexibility in timing of abatement 
investments that is provided to firms. Flexibility in timing is important for both the firm 
and the market as a whole—for instance, unnecessary price increases resulting from firms 
all seeking new equipment at the same time would want to be avoided.  
Several economists have made the case for banking to be included in any cap-
and-trade program dealing with greenhouse gases. For one, greenhouse gas caps will 
likely decline over time, so banking could play a huge role so that firms may achieve a 
greater near-term reduction in emissions. It is also true that for stock pollutants like 
greenhouse gases, current and future costs and benefits are linked.135 Any future 
innovation can have quite an impact on the current emissions rate and the future 
emissions rate. If innovation can reduce future abatement costs, then it would make sense 
to postpone some abatement until the future, when firms can reduce emissions in a more 
efficient manner. 
A further possible design feature that would also provide flexibility to firms in 
terms of the timing of their abatement is the concept of borrowing. Given certain 
constraints, firms could be allowed to borrow permits from the future for use earlier on in 
the program. Although neither the US Acid Rain Program nor the UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme made use of borrowing, it was proposed in the Climate Stewardship Act put 
together by Senators McCain and Lieberman. In addition, the European Emissions 
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Trading Scheme also allows borrowing, and economists have noted that the cost 
protection provided by borrowing in the early years of a program is advantageous to 
participants.136 Borrowing also includes, however, some notable disadvantages as well, 
such as the possibility of firms delaying costly investments in clean technologies.137 
Monitoring and reporting in a cap-and-trade scheme are particularly important 
since they heavily influence the overall integrity of the program. In order to ensure a 
successful program, procedures should be standardized, and there should be clear and 
simple rules without the need for pre-approval of trades. Part of the problem with US 
environmental policies in the 1970s was that firms needed prior approval from the 
government before they could perform any trades, and this greatly hampered trading by 
increasing uncertainty and transactions costs for the firms. This requirement was dropped 
in 1990 in the Acid Rain Program, which lowered uncertainty and transactions costs for 
firms and also lowered administrative costs for the government. Another important 
feature of the Acid Rain Program that contributed to its success is the accurate measure 
of total emissions. The program required all coal power units to continuously monitor 
their emissions with equipment called CEMS that sends continuous information to the 
EPA. The UK Emissions Trading Scheme had a much different approach to monitoring 
emissions, whereby “verifiers” are used to check baseline calculations and level of 
emissions. So, instead of the cost of monitoring being the firm’s responsibility, as it is in 
the US Acid Rain Program, the cost is taken care of by the UK government. Stiff 
penalties that were greater than the marginal cost of abatement also existed in both 
programs for those sources that did not have sufficient allowances to cover their 
emissions, which resulted in very high compliance throughout both programs. 
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A successful program must also contain a compliance process that is relatively 
straightforward. One of the main complaints by participants in the UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme is that they were not given sufficient time to understand the rules of the scheme 
before committing to join. Thus, prior to the compliance period, rules must be clear and 
well-understood by participants. A successful scheme should also include grace periods, 
as both the US Acid Rain Program and the UK Emissions Trading Scheme did, and these 
periods should be relatively short, just long enough to allow for any verification or 
review procedures. Lastly, there should be clear penalties for non-compliance that are 
strict enough to provide the incentive to abate rather than to incur the penalty.  
The last major aspect of cap-and-trade design that policymakers will need to take 
into consideration is the linkage with other climate change programs, and this includes 
both linking existing regional programs with a national program, and linking a national 
program with other existing international trading programs. As mentioned previously, 
several regional and state programs already exist in the US, and other locations are 
actively pursuing carbon reduction plans. New York has established a Greenhouse Gas 
Task Force to investigate methods of reducing their emissions, and governors in New 
England are looking into a cap-and-trade program together with eastern Canada. 
Policymakers will want to ensure that these regions and states will have no problems 
integrating into a national program, and they will need to take appropriate measures in 
either linking the programs or taking care of any overlap that may exist. In addition, the 
US may want to consider international trading. There are several economists who believe 
that an international program is essential because of the global nature of the climate 
change problem.138 The UK had difficulties integrating into the EU Emissions Trading 
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Scheme because of incompatibility issues, but it is possible that the US could avoid the 
same problem if they design a cap-and-trade program that is in sync with the EU’s 
program. Stavins (2005) claims that international greenhouse gas trading has the potential 
to work successfully, but only if allocation mechanisms can be developed to address the 
equity concerns of developing countries.139 Indeed, part of the reason that the US chose 
not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 was because of equity issues concerning 
developing countries. It is likely that these equity concerns will be discussed at the 
upcoming conference, COP-15, that will be taking place in Copenhagen, Denmark in 
December 2009, where the goal is to formulate a successful post-Kyoto agreement.  
Analysis of the above-mentioned design issues allows one to formulate a 
suggestion for a possible future cap-and-trade program for the US. Before doing so, 
however, it may be beneficial to consider suggestions already put forth by other 
economists and politicians. Holmes & Friedman (2000) have formulated two different 
options for cap-and-trade design that they believe might be successful in practice.140 The 
first option is a supply-side controlled, upstream scheme covering carbon emissions with 
permits being auctioned. Since the scheme is upstream, there is a limit on sales from 
energy producers and distributors, and permits are auctioned at the point of extraction for 
coal, at the point of refining for oil, and at the point of distribution for natural gas. The 
motivation of the scheme is to minimize the number of permit holders so as to reduce 
administrative and transactions costs, although the program would still cover almost all 
energy-related carbon that could potentially be found in the atmosphere. As mentioned 
before, allowances would be allocated by an auction that would be open to carbon 
producers as well others who are interested in the market. Auctions would offer permits 
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for the next compliance period as well as for future compliance periods, and a number of 
permits would be set aside to fund an early reduction credit system in order to provide 
incentives for renewable energy generation and energy conservation. Other than the 
permits that are set aside, the auctions would be revenue-raising. The size of the cap 
would depend upon the emissions of other greenhouse gases and how much credit is 
given for carbon sequestration, but Holmes & Friedman (2000) estimate a cap of 
approximately 1300 million tonnes of carbon. Given such a cap, the annual amount of 
revenue generated would be approximately $100 billion.  
The second design option that Holmes & Friedman (2000) propose is a 
combustion-side controlled, downstream scheme covering carbon emissions with permits 
freely allocated. The scheme operates under a hybrid design where both emissions 
trading and emissions standards are used to control carbon emissions. The initial 
allowance allocation would allocate permits to the largest individual consumers of fossil 
fuels using an input-based energy allocation method—the total emissions cap on large 
combustors would be allocated in proportion to historic fossil fuel consumption. Rather 
than allocating permits based solely on historic carbon emissions, the scheme rewards 
carbon efficiency in its allocation by granting more permits to users of fuels with lower 
than average carbon content. Permits would also be allocated to automobile 
manufacturers to cover future emissions coming from light duty vehicles and freight 
trucks that are manufactured. Allocating permits to automobile manufacturers is an 
attempt to cap total emissions from light duty vehicles and trucks, as opposed to 
controlling carbon emissions rates, thus discarding the need for a direct gas price 
increase. The design attributes of this second suggested scheme resemble the design of 
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the Acid Rain Program’s cap-and-trade program, as emissions trading is used to control 
emissions from large sources. The program would have a partial cap on emissions—a cap 
would be placed on large industrial facilities, electricity generation and some automotive 
emissions. Emissions standards would also exist for residential, commercial, and small 
industrial emitters of carbon, covering approximately 11% of all emissions from direct 
combustion in the residential and commercial sectors. The entire scheme would cover 
approximately 83% of total emissions in the US—those sources not covered would be 
some primary fuel combustion by non-manufacturing industrial firms and non-highway 
transportation.  
It should also be noted that on March 31, 2009, the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee released a draft of a new climate change bill. Representatives Henry Waxman 
(D-California) and Ed Markey (D-Massachusetts) wrote the “American Clean Energy and 
Security Act”, which presents a general plan for a future cap-and-trade program for 
greenhouse gas emissions. The program is intended to begin in 2012 and calls for rather 
dramatic reductions in greenhouse gases overall, such as an 83% reduction below 2005 
levels by 2050. Interestingly enough, however, the bill does not specify the most 
controversial aspect concerning cap-and-trade design: the allowance allocation method. 
Rather, the decision between a free allocation and an auction was left open for the time 
being. The bill differs considerably from President Obama’s plan for combating climate 
change, however. During his election campaign, Obama called for an economy-wide cap-
and-trade system that would reduce carbon emissions by roughly 80% below 1990 levels 
by 2050. The scheme would auction 100% of the permits and the auction would be 
revenue-raising, using a portion of the revenue to invest in other energy programs, while 
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rebating the rest to communities adversely affected by the transition to a new energy, low 
carbon economy. Due to current differences in opinion concerning the best cap-and-trade 
design, it is possible that debate over climate change policy may continue for some time. 
For now, another recommendation can be made based on lessons learned from past 
programs and current economic theory and research. 
 
Part IV: Policy Recommendation 
 At this point, the successes and failures of two prominent cap-and-trade programs 
have been studied in depth. In addition, some theoretical design issues of cap-and-trade 
programs in general and in the context of greenhouse gas trading have been considered. 
Based on lessons learned from the US Acid Rain Program, the UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme, and economic theory, it is possible to make a policy recommendation for 
dealing with climate change in the US.  
 The first choice to be made concerning policy design is which pollutants the 
scheme will cover. Although the UK Emissions Trading Scheme was seemingly 
successful in covering a basket of greenhouse gases, it would be beneficial for a US 
scheme to only cover CO2 emissions for compatibility reasons. In addition, CO2 is the 
greenhouse gas that has the biggest impact on climate change, so significant 
improvements can still be made with CO2 reductions only. Another important question 
concerns which sectors should be covered by the scheme. Although there are notable 
advantages with an economy-wide scheme, I recommend starting with the electricity 
sector only, at least for the first phase of the scheme. Costs tend to be relatively high with 
an economy-wide scheme, and starting with one sector can work to ease firms in to a 
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climate change policy. An eventual expansion to an economy-wide scheme is 
recommended for later phases. The electricity industry is also often regarded as the most 
important sector since it currently contributes to roughly 33% of carbon emissions in the 
US. In addition, several technologies already exist in the market that would help lower 
CO2 emissions for the electricity industry, including compact fluorescent lamps, 
insulation techniques, etc. A last general design feature of the program concerns the 
question of upstream vs. downstream. It seems clear that for a carbon-trading program, an 
upstream system will work best, especially if the scheme eventually expands to be 
economy-wide. An upstream system will minimize the amount of parties that need 
permits while also keeping administrative and transactions costs lower. Once the scheme 
expands to be economy-wide, the higher costs that result should, in theory, be passed 
forward to encourage dynamic efficiency in the form of fuel- and energy-reducing 
technologies. Plus, an upstream system was used in the UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
that dealt with the same pollutant, and there seemed to be no problems with this design. 
Thus, for the basic overall program design, it is recommended that the scheme operate 
under an upstream system, deal with CO2 emissions only, and cover only the electricity 
sector for its first phase. 
 A further design feature concerns opt-in and opt-out provisions. Since the opt-in 
provision implemented in the US Acid Rain Program worked well, it is recommended 
that a US carbon-trading program contain an opt-in provision in its second phase if the 
scheme goes economy-wide, as long as the monitoring and overhead costs required of 
participants are kept relatively low. An opt-out provision is not recommended because it 
may cause firms to leave the scheme. Indeed, the only way an opt-out provision would 
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work is if the program provided some sort of incentive to stay in the scheme, and this 
may increase administrative costs. Compliance periods must also be decided. As noted 
previously, a multiple-phase program is recommended, with the second phase opening up 
the scheme to cover other sectors, and possibly extend to become economy-wide. It is 
also recommended that there exist an appropriate pre-enforcement period when firms can 
learn the rules of the scheme. Since one of the criticisms of the UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme was that firms were not given sufficient time to learn the rules, it is important to 
ensure that all participants are clear on the workings of the scheme before it is officially 
enforced. Lastly, compliance periods should be compatible with international agreements, 
notably post-Kyoto commitment periods and the EU Emission Trading Scheme’s trading 
periods. The current Kyoto commitment period as well as the EU trading period both end 
in 2012, which may be an appropriate time to launch the first phase of a US carbon-
trading scheme, if legislation can be passed in time.  
 One of the most important decisions concerning cap-and-trade design is which 
allowance allocation method to use. Advantages of auctions and free allocations, the two 
main types of initial allocation, have been noted; however, the benefits of a revenue-
raising auction seem to far outweigh any benefits of a free allocation. Several studies 
(Burtraw et al. 2001, Cramton & Kerr 1998) have found that the revenue-raising auction 
is the most cost-effective approach, implying that it is also the most efficient way of 
allocating allowances. Both firms and the government are given much more flexibility; 
firms are able to decide how many permits they will need and can then purchase them 
from the government, and the government has several options for using the auction 
revenue. An auction system promotes dynamic efficiency—incentives for innovation are 
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greater for the industry because innovators can benefit from the innovation-induced fall 
in permit prices. Auctions also guarantee liquidity so that new entrants and small traders 
can be guaranteed of the availability of permits. Distributional effects of an auction 
system depend on how the revenue is used, although it should be noted that under a free 
allocation system, the redistribution of wealth only affects those receiving permits. 
 There are several different types of auctions that a scheme could use, however the 
best option for a US carbon-trading program is an ascending clock auction with uniform 
pricing. This type of auction is easier to implement for both buyers and sellers since the 
buyer only has to bid a single quantity in each round. Other advantages noted are the 
ability to avoid a mechanism for collusion under uniform pricing but still having a 
resulting market-clearing price, and the guarantee of rapid convergence of prices (since 
the price increases by one bid increment with each round of bidding). It is also 
recommended that permits be auctioned for future compliance periods as well as for the 
upcoming compliance period in order to help develop an active futures and options 
market and thus improving risk allocation. In addition, auctions should be held on a 
regular basis, such as quarterly, so that cash flow problems that often result from less 
frequent sale can be avoided. Another important decision concerning the auction is how 
to use the revenues. It is recommended that revenues be used to finance reductions in 
some pre-existing distortionary taxes—this way, polluters would effectively be buying 
the right to pollute from the public. The government could decide which taxes would be 
best to reduce with the auction revenue, but some suggestions are labor, payroll, capital, 
or consumption taxes or the deficit could also be reduced in order to create efficiency 
gains. It may be best to employ a partial auction for the first phase of the program in 
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order to ease participants in to an auction system, while freely allocating the rest of the 
permits. In addition, it is also recommended that a portion of permits be withheld for use 
in a credit offset system where firms can invest in renewable energy and energy 
conservation projects. Once the scheme is in full force, it is suggested that the most cost-
effective allocation approach is to have permits be 100% auctioned (with the exception of 
those withheld for offsets) in an ascending-clock auction with uniform pricing. 
 Trading should be allowed between all participants without prior approval, and 
banking of allowances is also permitted. A major part of the US Acid Rain Program’s 
success was the option to bank allowances since it can contribute to early reductions. It 
also provides flexibility for firms in the timing of their abatement. It makes sense to allow 
banking for a CO2 trading program because of the probability of caps declining over time, 
thus firms may want to make early reductions. Due to the probability of caps decreasing 
as the scheme goes on, borrowing is not recommended, since it may influence firms to 
delay investments in clean technologies to a time when the caps are smaller and more 
emission reductions are required.  
 In combination with banking, it is recommended that the program contain a 
“safety valve” so that the cap-and-trade program may perform similarly to a tax system. 
The safety valve will allow the EPA to sell permits at a predetermined price so that the 
marginal cost of abatement will never exceed the safety valve price, despite any 
economic growth or other factors that may occur that would raise permit prices. The 
safety valve will thus act to control price volatility as the emission target is gradually 
tightened over time. It is suggested that the safety valve be dropped from the program 
once Phase II is enforced with a tighter emission cap or when international trading 
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begins, especially since a safety valve may produce barriers to international trading.141 In 
the first phase of the program, however, the cap-and-trade program employed would be 
known as a hybrid trading system due to the existence of a safety valve and the ability for 
participants to bank emissions. 
Installation of some sort of continuous monitoring equipment, similar to the 
equipment used in the US Acid Rain Program, should also be required. Requiring 
installation on the part of firms will be raising costs for firms since they will have to pay 
for the installation, as opposed to the verification monitoring method used in the UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme. If the US wants to eventually extend the scheme to be 
economy-wide, however, the government will incur far too many administrative costs if 
they had to finance the verification of emissions. Thus, equipment installation by firms is 
the best option for monitoring. Stiff penalties must also be in place for non-compliance 
that are greater than the marginal cost of abatement, although grace periods should also 
be put in place so that firms may reconcile any excess emissions they may have.  
 The last design feature to consider concerns the linkage of regional programs 
already in place in the US with a new national program, as well as the US’s possible 
future integration into the international trading scene. It has been recommended that the 
phases of the US program operate under the same timeframe as the Kyoto and post-Kyoto 
commitment periods. In addition, it would be beneficial if the program allowed 
participants to make use of the Clean Development Mechanism—one of the three flexible 
mechanisms available to signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. Firms will be allowed to 
invest in projects that aim to reduce emissions in developing countries in exchange for 
Certified Emission Reduction credits. Credits may subsequently be used to meet 
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reduction targets under the trading scheme. Since climate change is a global problem, it 
does not necessarily matter where reductions take place. Undertaking a reduction project 
in a country where reductions might not otherwise occur is beneficial in mitigating global 
climate change. 
In case there are any compatibility issues for pre-existing regional programs, a 
temporary opt-out should be an option for such entities. In terms of possible international 
trading, it is recommended that the US scheme operate domestically only for at least the 
first phase of the program, while participants gain experience with emissions trading, as 
long as this is feasible with the post-Kyoto commitment periods. Later on, however, it is 
recommended that the US engage in international trading. Since climate change is a 
global problem, it makes sense that countries coordinate and address the problem in a 
global manner. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In his famous 1960 paper, “The Problem of Social Cost”, Ronald Coase calls for a 
change in approach in the treatment of “harmful effects.”142 Instead of allowing the 
government to control emissions limits, Coase recommended the use of the market for 
valuing property rights. Nearly thirty years later, Coase’s insight was fully realized with 
the implementation of the US Acid Rain Program, the first wide-scale cap-and-trade 
scheme. The program proved to be successful, with total SO2 emissions from electric 
generating units falling below the scheme’s cap at 8.9 million tons as of 2007. The 
reduction in emissions from the power industry has improved air quality, according to 
scientific monitoring, with wet sulfate deposition decreasing in many parts of the country. 
Counterfactual analysis has demonstrated that the Acid Rain Program has been 
responsible for a large amount of reductions in emissions, as opposed to any external 
factors. Within the program, the allowance market has proven to be robust with clear 
prices and low transactions costs, and dynamic efficiency has been observed in the 
switching to low-sulfur coal by many utilities and the increased investment in scrubbers. 
Most importantly, studies have shown that the program was cost-effective. Carlson et al. 
(2000) estimate cost savings attributed to the program to be around $250 million (in 
$1995), stating that approximately 80% of the decline in marginal abatement costs can be 
attributed to the flexibility available within the program.  
 The success of the Acid Rain Program encouraged an increased attention on the 
use of market-based instruments for solving environmental problems. Indeed, the country 
continued to support flexibility in policy in the Kyoto negotiations. As a result, one of the 
flexible mechanisms that the Kyoto Protocol encouraged its signatories to undertake was 
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emissions trading. The UK chose to take advantage of this mechanism as part of its 
Climate Change Programme, with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to meet 
its Kyoto target. The scheme was largely successful, with Direct Participants achieving 
their reduction target of 3.96 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent. Although the scheme was 
voluntary, it saw 100% compliance by its Direct Participants, with the group exceeding 
their reduction target by a factor of almost 5 in the first year of the scheme. Despite initial 
baseline miscalculations, the allowance market proved to be reasonably liquid with broad 
participation. Dynamic and static efficiency have also been demonstrated. A survey of 
participants showed that many participants achieved their reductions by installing 
emissions abatement equipment as well as by modifying the ways in which existing 
equipment was used for optimal energy use. Static efficiency was also achieved as there 
was a reallocation of abatement from high-cost to lower-cost sources. 
 Valuable lessons can be drawn from both the US Acid Rain Program and the UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme for future environmental policy, and for future climate 
change policy in particular. Although the Acid Rain Program dealt with sulfur dioxide as 
opposed to greenhouse gases, it has arguably been the most successful example of an 
emissions trading scheme to date and has thus been worth studying. Most importantly, 
both programs have demonstrated that cap-and-trade programs have the ability to achieve 
least-cost reductions in emissions. Further economic research has shown that a cap-and-
trade scheme is arguably the best option for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. In 
addition, countless studies have been conducted in an attempt to determine the 
appropriate design features of a cap-and-trade scheme for climate policy. While opinions 
differ as to whether permits should be auctioned or freely distributed, whether specific 
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sectors should be covered or if the scheme should be economy-wide, whether firms 
should be allowed to bank or borrow permits, and more, there is no doubt that a plethora 
of options exist regarding a market-based environmental policy. The goal is to formulate 
a policy that can achieve an environmental objective in an economically efficient manner. 
 This paper has argued that a US domestic hybrid cap-and-trade scheme that 
covers carbon dioxide emissions upstream in multiple phases will be able to achieve 
emission reductions in a least-cost way.  The paper recommends an upstream scheme that 
starts small by requiring mandatory participation from the electricity sector only and a 
partial auction of permits in Phase I, but then expands to become economy-wide with a 
nearly 100% revenue-raising auction of permits. A portion of permits will be withheld for 
clean energy projects that reward emission reduction credits in return for participation. It 
is further suggested that the scheme contain a safety valve in Phase I and unlimited 
banking throughout the program. Instituting a cap on emissions is bound to lead to 
reductions, but it is the different features of the trading program that determine whether 
or not reductions are made in a cost-effective manner. This study of two successful cap-
and-trade programs in conjunction with economic research concerning program design 
has hopefully shed light on the best options for future climate change policy in the US. 
Climate change is a serious issue that requires immediate political attention, and the 
implementation of some sort of regulation on emissions can no longer be ignored. It is 
worthwhile for the US government to remember its success with the “grand policy 
experiment” of 1990 and to continue its legacy of being a world leader in market-based 
environmental policy. A cap-and-trade program for climate change policy is the crucial 
next step. 
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